Has anything changed in this regard in recent times?

It has been thirteen years since the formal end of The Second Chechen War, and around twenty years from the end of fighting. A generation that does not remember the war reached adulthood. For the young Chechens, the fact that bombs don’t fall on their heads is something normal. Therefore peace and gradual rebuilding of the country do not play such an important role, and the actual support for Kadyrov is surely smaller. The more so, because Kadyrov is an authoritarian ruler who gets rid of his opponents in a brutal way.

It seems however that the most popular view in Chechnya is that there is no alternative to Kadyrov’s rule. The need for stability is still strong. If one is not an oppositionist, it is possible to work and live there quite normally; and also if one is not a member of an oppositionist’s family, as in Chechnya there is a collective responsibility. Kadyrovtsy forces persecute those related to their enemies and even bloggers from the West who criticize their leader. Those who had a chance to rub shoulders with the West, and have individualistic tendencies, would like for instance to work in non-governmental organizations – are suffocating in Chechnya.

At the same time, we're dealing with a revival of traditionalism. Kadyrov is appealing to traditional values, including Islam. One could assume that many Chechens like it. In addition, Kadyrov can put his foot down when dealing with Moscow. He positions himself as the faithful “soldier” of Vladimir Putin, yet his allegiance to the Russian state and other leaders of the Federation is doubtful. It was clearly visible when Dmitry Medvedev was president.

Therefore it is hard to tell how many Chechens actually support Kadyrov. For sure, he is not commonly hated on. It’s also not like he gets obedience only by force.

Going back to the estimates of prof. Małaszenko – it is surprising for me, that only a few years after the formal end to The Second Chechen War, in which the Russians enslaved Chechnya, destroying villages and cities, including Grozny, there was such high support for a pro-Russian leader.

I’d say that in Chechnya there are no pro-Russian leaders. Those associated with Ramzan Kadyrov are often called that, but in truth, they are first and foremost pro-Chechnyan politicians. They work for the wellbeing of Chechnya, for what they understand by it, and in addition, of course, for their own interests. Therefore they believe that the alliance with Russia is beneficial. I remember the opinions of Chechens from a few years back, that in truth they won The Second Chechen War because it is Russia that pays them- and it is always the loser who pays, not the winner.

Kadyrov created an ethically Chechen state. Up until the fall of the Soviet Union, a quarter of inhabitants of Chechnya were Slavs, mostly Russians. Nowadays, the Chechens constitute 98-99 percent of society. As I’ve mentioned this is accompanied by a return of traditional values: revival of Islam in its traditional sense, and also bringing back of traditional institutions such as i.e. councils of elders. Formally Chechnya is a part of Russia, yet in a cultural and civilizational sense - it is far removed from it. Even Russian writers speak of Chechnya as an internal foreign land, a tribal territory.

Therefore Kadyrov achieved considerable independence?

At the moment- paradoxically- Chechnya is more independent from Moscow than during the times of pro-sovereignty leaders, Dzokhar Dudayev or Aslan Maskhadov. Contrary to Kadyrov they had a bad rapport with the Russian leaders who blocked the republic. Chechnya was overcome by poverty, various armed units roamed the streets. This is because the leadership of Dudayev or Maskhadov was being contested by other circles. Kadyrov has dealt with the opposition – he either brutally eliminated those opposing him or forced them to leave the country. Some switched to his side.

Even though Chechnya is formally a Russian republic, the society doesn’t quite feel it. Chechen soldiers do not feel conquered; the Russian garrison doesn’t keep a tight grip on them, as it was during the tsarist or communist times. Kadyrov, of course, owes his position to Moscow. That is why he tries to reciprocate.

Still during The First Chechen War Akhmat Kadyrov and his son Ramzan fought against the Russians together with separatist guerillas. How did this shift in their approach come about?

It was a very interesting process that turned a national liberation war into jihad. The Kadyrovs always represented Islam traditional for the Caucasus– with a cult of saints, visiting graves, respect for the elders, who for instance are allowed better places in a mosque etc.

For the Salafists on the other hand, who represent radical Islam that often constitutes a base for terrorist movements – this of course doesn’t mean that every Salafist is a terrorist, to the contrary, mostly they are very pious Muslims who adhere to strict rules – traditional Islam is paganism. Salafists would rhetorically ask: if we’re all equal in front of Allah, why is somebody to get a better place in a mosque? Pilgrimages to the saints’ burial sites and the cult of saints in general, the Salafists view as sacrilege.

For Akhmat Kadyrov, a soviet Muslim, and his son Ramzan, the biggest enemies were the Salafists. When the national liberation war turned into jihad, the enemy was singular. If Moscow was to help them fight the Salafists, they had to cooperate with it. Especially because such a setup gave them a high rank.

How could a national liberation movement turn into jihad?

The idea of Chechen independence was ruined in the interwar period from 1996-to 1999, when Chechnya was in fact, independent. This was a time of extreme poverty caused by Moscow’s blockade of Chechnya and its various provocations against the republic. In addition, soaring unemployment led to numerous kidnappings for ransom. The Republic turned into a loose federation of provinces, controlled by individual field commanders from the war-times, who fought each other for bounty. The power of president Aslan Maskhadov did not reach far beyond the presidential palace, and ordinary people had it tough. Independence, therefore, was associated with chaos, lawlessness, and poverty.

This is why the Chechens started looking towards the Islamic republic, hoping that perhaps “the religion bringing about justice will put an end to this”. Hence the pro-independence sympathies were replaced with the growing popularity of the Salafi movement. In addition, Chechen politicians noticed that the only people fighting for free Chechnya are Chechen. The fight for an Islamic state on the other hand could draw in the neighbors from the Caucasus: Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. In addition, they were wondering who will fund free Chechnya? Maybe someone from abroad but it’s uncertain. Meanwhile, for sure someone will be willing to support jihad.

There were fewer and fewer supporters of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (that’s what Chechnya was called at the time). President Maskhadov, who used to be in favor of a secular state, was so influenced by the Salafi movement, that he made Shamil Basayev prime minister. Basayev was one of the main supporters of an Islamic republic. In this way, Maskhadov wanted to broaden his political base, and achieve greater social support for his government. Meanwhile, Basayev intended to increase the role of radical Islam.

In this political landscape, in 1999, The Second Chechen War broke out. Let’s keep in mind that it was preceded by a series of bomb attacks in apartment buildings in Russia, most likely organized by Russian intelligence. Moscow used this as a pretext to begin an offensive. For Vladimir Putin, these were favorable circumstances to come to power.

At this point, there were only a few in favor of an independent Chechnya. After a few years of fighting- almost none. Some were physically eliminated, others moved to the West, yet others became more radical and turned into fighters striving for the establishment of an Islamic republic. Finally, there were those who joined Akhmat Kadyrov, placed by the Russians at the top of a puppet Chechnyan government, thinking that his rule would be an optimal solution.

The latter enjoyed amnesty, announced first by Akhmat Kadyrov, and later by his son Ramzan. If guerilla fighters laid down their arms, their “sins” were forgiven. Many of them later reinforced the Kadyrovtsy forces.

How did the beginning of Akhmat Kadyrov’s rule as the Chechen leader look like?

Russians realized that although they could militarily conquer Chechnya they were not able to maintain their control there. The process of Chechnyazation has begun- looking for loyal Chechen men who will formally rule the republic. As a result, Akhmat Kadyrov was chosen, a man who fought the Salafi movement. At the start, his position was fairly weak and upheld mostly by Russian bayonets. Ultimately he did not stay in power for long, as he was killed in 2004 in a terrorist attack at a football stadium in Grozny.

Ramzan, when his father died, was still very young. Formally he couldn't take over. It happened three years later when he turned thirty.

However unofficially he came to power in Chechnya straight after the death of Akhmat Kadyrow.

Yes, there is a famous photo, where following his father’s death, Ramzan (in sweats) met with Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin. Many Chechnyans saw how he travels to the Kremlin and speaks with the Russian president as an equal.

Ramzan was strengthening his power for many years. First and foremost he eliminated his competitors, other circles which were willing to cooperate with the Russians such as the Yamadayev clan. Currently, Kadyrov doesn’t have opponents in Chechnya. He pacified the entire republic. Even if some Chechens don’t like his rule, they are keeping quiet. Those against Kadyrov can’t feel safe in Moscow, and if someone is an ardent opponent – then not even in the West.

Of course, there are those unfavorable towards Kadyrov, mostly in the Middle East and in Western Europe. In Chechnya itself, none were left.

The Kadyrovtsy forces are above the law. They’re committing murders, rapes, tortures, and kidnappings with impunity, in Chechnya and beyond …

They are above the law, yet Kadyrov tries to keep them in line (he is aware that there are things such as family retribution) and uses them when he needs them for his aims. Undoubtedly, the Kadyrovtsy enjoy certain notoriety. This is something that Kadyrov needs as it legitimizes his power.

Kadyrov and his people are linked with famous murder cases, such as the killing of Anna Politkovskaya, Boris Nemtsov, or Chechen dissidents’ such as Umar Israilov, a former bodyguard to Kadyrov, who was killed in Vienna in 2009

Of course, Kadyrov himself has not been proven anything. However, it is commonly accepted that he had to know about these attacks. Much indicates that these kinds of “tasks” are what Putin needs him for.

Ramzan Kadyrov is in a unique position. He is formally a leader of one of the Russian republics; in truth, however, his troops operate also outside of Chechnya. Chechen soldiers kidnap Kadyrov’s opponents in numerous cities, even in Moscow. Kadyrov also speaks out about Russia's foreign policy. For instance, when a Muslim Rohingya minority was being persecuted in Myanmar, he organized a demonstration in Moscow, resulting in a correction of Putin’s policy towards the country – towards greater protection of the Rohingyas.

We’re dealing with a situation unpleasant for Moscow and based on mutual interdependence. On one hand, Ramzan Kadyrov depends on Moscow’s money. On the other hand Moscow is dependent on Kadyrov to guarantee peace and stability in Chechnya. His position is very strong. Some even say that in Russia, he is the number two politician right after Putin. This is of course an exaggeration. However, for sure, he enjoys much autonomy.

Let’s go back to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is worth stressing that Chechens also fight for the Ukrainians. What do we know about these troops?

We’re talking about two battalions named after Dzhokhar Dudayev and Sheikh Mansur. Both took part in the defense of Ukraine already in 2014 in the Donbas. The commander of the Dudayev battalion is Adam Osmayev, a very interesting figure (an independence activist accused by the Kremlin of planning an assassination of Vladimir Putin; there were many attempts at murdering Osmayev, in one such attack conducted in 2017 near Kyiv, his wife Amina Okuyeva was killed. She was a doctor and a military person born in Odessa to a family of Polish descent – ed.).

The man in charge of the Sheikh Mansur battalion is Muslim Cheberloevsky. These are people connected to the Chechen diaspora in Europe, so-called Ichkers – the proponents of the independence movement.

The Ichkers believe that Ramzan Kadyrov is a usurper. Kadyrov on the other hand believes that they’re the traitors of the Chechen nation. He established a prize for the head of Adam Osmayev and that of Muslim Cheberloevsky. The prize is 500 thousand dollars each. There is also a prize for the head of Andrij Bilecky, the commander of the “Azov” battalion.

How can the failures of Kadyrovtsy, and the Russian army in general influence the standing of Ramzan Kadyrov?

If it turned out that the Kadyrovtsy troops were, in fact, dispersed – and in Chechnya, it is hard to keep anything a secret, due to the strong family ties and information spreading through the grapevine – it can destabilize Kadyrov’s position. Having his own army legitimizes the Chechen leader. Yet if this army is failing, it diminishes his power. Documented losses of the Kadyrovtsy troops, or Russia’s defeat, and a possible change at the Kremlin- would impact Kadyrov who would lose his support.

Does it mean that none but Putin like him at the Kremlin?

Moscow elites perceive Kadyrov as a necessary element of the Russian power structure in the Caucasus. He enjoys a special relationship with Putin, and this protects him. Yet in many circles – also among the Russian power structures– he is disliked because he is arrogant. Recently he sent his people to Nizhny Novgorod to kidnap the mother of his critic. The fact that people from another republic come in and do their own thing is not comfortable for the local authorities. There were many situations just like this. Whenever the Kadyrovtsy soldiers get arrested – there is a phone call from “upstairs” to let them go. Local FSB and maybe even the FSB at the national level, does not like Kadyrov. Among the intelligence, many are waiting for him to slip, and when he does, a few would pity him.

However, at the moment Ramzan Kadyrov is untouchable because of the support of Putin, who treats him almost like a son. This however does not translate into broader support among Moscow’s elites

Does the end of Putin mean the end of Kadyrov?

Ramzan Kadyrov would not be removed immediately. The elites in Moscow are aware that if he was not there, the situation in Chechnya could become very difficult for the Russians. For sure he would not enjoy such a strong position. It is very probable that if the power at the Kremlin was to change hands, maybe not immediately, but eventually, this could lead to the fall of Kadyrov.

– Interviewed by Łukasz Lubański
– Translated by Sally Jastrzębska

Wojciech Górecki is an analyst at the OSW Center for Eastern Studies, reporter, and an expert on the Caucasus and Central Asia