When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski first mentioned the guilt of the USSR for starting World War II at the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp liberation ceremony in January this year, he was answered by Russian President Vladimir Putin himself.

In his opinion, attempts to distort history - and in his view accusing the USSR is such an attempt - is "spitting in the face" of people who fought against Nazism. And if no one in Ukraine protests against Zelensky's words, it is only because they know perfectly well that if they do, "persecution will begin immediately".

WAR IN UKRAINE

With this exchange of words, a new phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war began. This time a war over history.

Brotherly nation

As long as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet aggression of 17 September 1939 were mainly criticised by Poland, the Russians tried to counteract by proving, for example, that it was our country that was Hitler's de facto ally and that by participating in the partition of Czechoslovakia it had itself led to the war.

Similar criticisms of the Pact from Lithuania and Latvia were countered by arguing that in fact it was the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians themselves who wanted to become part of the USSR.

But Ukraine is a different matter altogether. Even if there is an ongoing (or rather, smouldering) war in Donbass, the official, still prevailing standpoint of the authorities in Moscow is that Ukrainians are a brotherly nation (and, according to extreme claims, part of the great Russian nation). Maybe temporarily under nationalist rule, but the situation will change one day and Russian-Ukrainian friendship will reign again. And the axis of this friendship is the joint fight against the fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War, i.e. the Soviet-German war.

The argumentation presented in the Russian media seems on the surface to be logical. Because, as a result of the aggression of 17 September, in October 1939 there were "elections" to the so-called People's Assembly of Western Ukraine, which asked the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to admit it to the Soviet Union. The request was, of course, granted, and on 1 November 1939 the four pre-war Polish provinces of Lwów, Tarnopol, Stanisławów and Volhynia were incorporated into the USSR, and on 15 November they became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

After the Second World War, the new borders of Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic roughly coincided with the line drawn in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. And these are the borders of Poland and independent Ukraine today. In other words, today's Ukraine actually benefited from both the Pact and the aggression of 17 September.

Why are Galicia and Volhynia Ukrainian?

Quoted by RIA Novosti, doctor of historical sciences Mikhail Diunov makes a simple comment on the contemporary Ukrainian position.

"Any attempt to blame the USSR for the aggression automatically leads to Ukraine becoming one of the accused as the main co-perpetrator [of that aggression]. Of course, Poles may ask quite logical questions: why do Galicia and Volhynia belong to the Ukrainians? Isn't it time to think about their return [to Poland] if they took them over as a result of a conspiracy with Germany?"

According to Diunov, since in 1991 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Supreme Council of Ukraine) adopted a law stating that the independent country is the legal successor of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the matter is obvious.

Dmitry Rodionov wrote similarly in the magazine Wzgliad. He admits that "he often meets in social networks with Ukrainians who express support for the Polish point of view - they say that it was the USSR and Germany that started the war, and that the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland and the annexation of part of its territory were unlawful".

Rodionov therefore proposes to the Ukrainians that this lawlessness be rectified. "Are you as a private person ready to recognise that Galicia, Volhynia, Transcarpathia and Northern Bukovina illegally belong to Ukraine and do you agree with the need to restore the rule of law", i.e. to give back these lands? The author criticises the attitude of the Ukrainians, who want the Russians to recognise themselves as occupiers, but do not intend to do so themselves.

On the other hand, Rodionov comments on Zelensky's words very simply. "Now there should be an apology for the 'annexation' and an offer to return Lviv". He writes bitterly that this has not happened, because "the average Ukrainian, if he says 'A', will never say 'B'".

On the side of the "Polish lord"

Why is this happening? The Russians point to several answers. The first is political.

As the RuBaltic portal wrote, intended primarily for the Baltic countries (but also having its Polish version, or perhaps it would be better to say an extremely anti-Polish version...) and presenting Russian propaganda in its purest form, Zelenski decided to cooperate with our country.

"Normalisation of relations with Poland was one of Zelensky's important election slogans. The electorate received it positively (even for the pro-Russian inhabitants of the southeast [of Ukraine] it is obvious that it is necessary to have friendship with the western neighbours). Moreover, coming to terms with the Poles is much easier than pulling the Ukrainian economy out of the crisis, giving back millions of 'earned money' or ending the war in Donbass," the portal wrote.

There is a clear contradiction in what the portal writes. For if Zelenski's predecessor, Petro Poroshenko, who is presented in the Russian media as a supporter of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA and almost a heir of Bandera, contributed to the deterioration of relations with Poland by promoting an anti-Polish version of history, then by changing Ukraine's historical policy Zelenski is probably doing the right thing?

Well, no. He would only be doing the right thing by accepting the Russian version of history. Since he did otherwise, he is just as bad as Poroshenko, albeit in a different way.

This was confirmed in an interview with TVP Weekly by the head of the Ukrainian Independent Political Centre, Svitlana Kononchuk. - Russian media are nervous that Ukraine's leaders are not behaving as expected. Zelenski is being treated more leniently than Poroshenko, but his words undermine the Kremlin's ideological agenda and show that he is not at all an easy, as previously thought, obedient partner of the Kremlin, she says.

There is also another answer. It was presented by the already mentioned Mikhail Diunov: "Ukrainians have been in the position of Polish slaves for centuries, whose job it is to support their master".

This statement is characteristic of Russian nationalists: the people of Ukraine either feel a natural and obvious connection to Russia and the Russian people, or they have surrendered to the Poles and remain slaves. This is a nationalist version of the Soviet message, in which "Polish lords" oppressed Ukrainian peasants. If the oppressed sided with their real enemy, the "Polish lord", it means they are someone worse.

Russia as the USSR

In Ukraine, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has long been referred to as the cause of the Second World War, although obviously there is not as much emotional attitude to it in Kiev as in Warsaw.

Last year Espreso TV wrote on its website: "No intergovernmental treaty signed in the 20th century has provoked such a long debate as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. According to most historians, the Pact was a plot by two dictatorial regimes to aggress Poland. It paved the way for the outbreak of the Second World War. Practitioners of international law overwhelmingly regard the Pact as illegal (...). Many jurists believe that the Pact should be classified as a crime against peace'.

Ukrainian historian Dr Vladislav Hrynevich, author of the book Red Imperialism, told the newspaper Ukrajina Moloda that: "Historians agree that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact opened Pandora's box and allowed Hitler and Stalin to start a world war. Secret protocols to the pact agreed to divide Europe between Hitler and Stalin. The implementation of this plan began a week later. Poland was smashed from two sides - first by the Nazis and then by the Red Army".

The essential reason for this position of Ukrainian historians is explained to some extent by Hrynevich's next statement: "Red Russian imperialism was similar to what we see now".

Because overall, this is how Ukrainian politicians or historians judge it: Russia always remains the same, whether under the Tsar or the USSR or now. It invaded Poland in September 1939, just as it invaded Ukraine in 2014.

Farewell to Bandera?

As the Lviv-based publicist and historian Vasyl Rasevych emphasised in an interview with TVP Weekly, the new historical policy of the Ukrainian state has not yet been outlined. Now a pandemic has got in the way. - The budgets of the Ministry of Culture and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UIPN) will be seriously reduced," he stresses.

And, he says, although the UIPN does not continue the policy of its previous head, Volodymyr Vyatrovych, it mostly acts inertly, partly because only the director has changed and all the staff have remained the same. But, according to Vasyl Rasevych, there is no alternative to an agreement with Poland on a shared history. - On the Ukrainian side there are visible efforts to say goodbye to ounocentrism and banderocentrism in historical policy," he stresses.

He adds that neither Ukraine nor Poland should get involved in Russian historical discussions, which are in fact an element of hybrid warfare.

"They cannot be answered, they should not be discussed, otherwise the Russians will prove that Russia has a historic right to special treatment. The issue of a serious breach of international law regarding national borders after World War II cannot be obscured by pseudo-historical discussions. They only block the information space. We must provide our own reliable, matter-of-fact and fact-based information. We should not conduct counter-propaganda, because it will only waste resources and time and actually help Russian propaganda", says Rasevych.

– Piotr Kościński, May 2020
– Translated by Tomasz Krzyżanowski