TVP WEEKLY: A publication by the Warsaw branch of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) entitled "The Faces of Treason?" describes, among other things, traitors from the ranks of the post-war independence underground and the operational methods of the security service. What definition of treason was adopted for the purposes of this publication?

TOMASZ ŁABUSZEWSKI: We use the definition of 'betrayal' as breaking the oath that conspirators took when joining an underground independence organisation. When writing about betrayal, the authors of the publication also have in mind a multi-level decision taken on emotional and ethical grounds.

Why?

Because in the case of the characters portrayed in the book, we are dealing with the betrayal of their fellow soldiers, their ideals, their principles and the ethics they had previously lived by.

What made people who showed great courage during the German occupation betray their friends and the oath they had taken?

The reasons varied and each figure described in the book "Faces of Treason?" must be considered individually. But I do see one general principle, namely the over-representation among traitors of those connected with intelligence. A sizable group of intelligence personnel, both those associated with the secret services of the Second Republic and those who found their way into intelligence during the Second World War, saw service as participation in a game detached from ideological foundations. From there, it was only a small step to treating the oath as an insignificant act.

And running an intelligence game for the sake of just playing a game?

Yes, and who was the disposer of their actions in the intelligence game was becoming a secondary issue. Perhaps this was also compounded by a high opinion of themselves. That is to say, seeing their role as so important that leading themselves to their deaths would be a waste.

SIGN UP TO OUR PAGE They carried out the betrayal knowingly.

Of course, after all, we are talking about highly intelligent people with broad minds. They perceived, especially from the second half of 1945 onwards, that the betrayal of Poland by the Western Allies meant that there would be no World War III and that the communist system was strengthening. They were left with two choices: to try to evacuate to the West or to choose a new master who would guarantee their survival. The choices they made were mostly deliberate. They fully understood the consequences to which their choice would lead. To this must be added pressure, although in most cases we are not talking about physical pressure, i.e. torture. The security ministry applied psychological pressure to them, related, for example, to the safety of their loved ones. For many, this was enough to make them choose.

Sometimes the main motive for betrayal was the conviction that continuing in the ranks of the independence conspiracy would be a burnt offering, and they did not feel like making that sacrifice. They felt it was necessary to get out of the sinking ship in time at the expense of others who believed in them and with whom they cooperated. And we are, after all, talking about relationships that were extremely close. Let me mention Kazimierz Czarnocki and Wincenty Kwieciński. Virtually all of the traitors we are describing got off scot-free, while their comrades-in-arms did not.

The Third Republic completely failed to deal with the phenomenon of treason in the independence underground. There was no accountability.

This is hardly to be expected when the Third Republic has failed to deal with the trial of the officers in charge of these traitors. Looking back at the stories we have described from the perspective of several decades, it is sad to say that their cynical choices proved successful.

And did they have any fair alternative? What could they have chosen?

It is difficult for me to judge these people based on my fate, because I don't live under the mental pressure that each day could be the last. My life does not depend on the investigating officer. When I look at the problem of betrayal, my point of reference is the figures of officers who remained faithful to their oath to the end. I always look at these fates through the prism of Witold Pilecki or Łukasz Ciepliński.

They not only stayed true to the oath they took, but also to their comrades-in-arms.

And that, for me, is the determinant of looking at the problem of betrayal and the choices made after the war. Even at the time of recruitment, there were opportunities to leave the situation with honour.

Really? Which ones?

For example, by denouncing oneself as having been recruited by the Security Office (UB). Of course, this required a great deal of courage, because the revenge of the ministry generally did not allow one to wait long. But I know of such cases and it undoubtedly allowed people to save face.

Who are you referring to?

For example, the commander of the gendarmerie of the 6th Wileńska Brigade of the WiN, Władysław Wasilewski 'Grot', whom the UB recruited in Warsaw. Immediately after his release from custody Wasilewski went to the market in Sokolow Podlaski or Drohiczyn and behaved in such a way that the militia stopped him. Everyone saw it and the case was over. He was later sent to prison for a few years, but after his release he could look people in the eye with pride.

But refusing to cooperate with the security services had huge consequences.

At best it was a few years' imprisonment, at worst death. If the Ministry of Public Security selected someone for recruitment who, from their point of view, had the knowledge to be used for operational purposes, and this person was not susceptible to recruitment, there were murders carried out by other secret collaborators on behalf of the Ministry.

How did traitors justify their choices?

There is a lack of testimony that they tried to explain themselves. A valuable and extremely dramatic example of an attempt to tell a story of betrayal are the poems of Czesław Białowąs, a juvenile agent who committed betrayal of an antique dimension. While still a juvenile pupil at a secondary school in Płock, he betrayed his mother, his brother Witold, a soldier of the 6th Wileńska Brigade, and his fellow soldiers. He also betrayed the memory of his eldest brother, murdered by the Ministry of Public Security. With his denunciations he contributed to the murder of many soldiers of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa) and WiN ( Freedom and Independence). Years later, he described his activities in a series of poems entitled. "Testimonies of a Sick Memory". Only that the interpretations of these poems are very different.

And how do you interpret them? Can they be seen as an attempt to ask for forgiveness?

It is not an attempt to ask for forgiveness. I see in these poems only an explanation of his attitude. Czesław Białowąs justifies his behaviour from the position of a man convinced of the rightness of his own conduct. There is something dramatic in this. After all, we are dealing with a man who fully recognised the gravity of his actions. He was tormented by his own past, but I see no need for expiation in this.

And what are the most likely reasons for WiN Third Board member Kazimierz Czarnocki's collaboration with the security police?

In the diary, which he probably kept on a regular basis, there is no word about the transition to the other side. But I think two reasons were decisive: pressure from the ministry through the arrest of his father and the conviction that there was no point in continuing to fight, and that the only thing he could do was to jump out of the sinking boat and save himself at the expense of others. Czarnocki, along with Halina Sosnowska, was the brains behind the Third Main Board of WiN. He contributed to building the strength of the WiN Central Area. The assessments he made of the situation in Poland are indicative of a very knowledgeable man. His analyses of the politics of Stanisław Mikołajczyk, for example, are dramatically true. As were his assessments of the Labour Party politicians who returned from exile to Poland to uphold communist rule. Czarnocki chose to collaborate with the communist secret police in a conscious manner, recognising that further struggle was pointless and could end tragically for him.

Did he value himself too much?

He was not a front-line man. He did not take part in the 1939 defensive war; he was most likely carrying out intelligence tasks. Nor did he fight in the Warsaw Uprising - he left Warsaw on 1 August. His tasks were completely different from armed struggle and in this he excelled. There was no room for unreflective heroism in his conduct, but there was room for cynical calculation.

And how many roles did Wacław Alchimowicz play in his life, and were any of them real? He was, among others, a participant in the September campaign in the ranks of the Polish Army, a soldier of the Home Army, a member of the Soviet partisans in the Vilnius region, and a functionary of the Ministry of Public Security in Warsaw.

There are no clear indications to answer this question. We are moving in the circle of presumptions and certain conjectures resulting from comparative analyses. Various interpretations can be made on the basis of the documentation that the Security Ministry decided to leave us for some reason. This is the right of every researcher and historian. We are talking about a man who took part in an operational combination of the security ministry and, probably, the ministry guaranteed him to get his head out of this operation whole. However, for unknown reasons, the resort did not fulfil the agreement and sacrificed him.

Doesn't this show in his favour and indicate that he was really committed to the independence side?

The fact that he was executed is no testimony to his true commitment to the independence side. I know of cases of people of merit for the communists who were murdered at various stages of their operations as a calculated sacrifice for the good of the system. This is a typical Soviet model showing that no merit protects anyone from death if the interests of the Communist Party and the secret services require it. For me, the key points are the small elements that remain in his case file. What we know from the documents raises gigantic doubts about the veracity of his involvement on the independence side.

What do you mean?

We are talking about a man who became involved in the underground at the beginning of the war. In the Novogrodok region, he betrayed his comrades-in-arms and went over to the side of the Soviets. What's more, Alchimowicz was such an important catch for the Soviets that he was put in charge of a special branch of the NKGB (foreign intelligence and counterintelligence - editor's note). His task was, among other things, to liquidate his former comrades-in-arms. We are also talking about a man who knew what treason was. At the moment when he switches allegedly to the pro-independence side, he holds the position of deputy chief in Department V of the MBP. His horizon of perception of reality is wide. Alchimowicz is well aware that the communist system in Poland has become entrenched and nothing will change it.

To cross over to the other side for a man who has already betrayed once seems quite irrational to me. Even if he were to be driven by sentimental-emotional considerations. I am thinking here of his relationship with Stanisław Kuchcinski, whom he knew even before the war from the National Radical Camp (ONR).

His behaviour within this conspiracy contradicts the principles of the conspiracy.

Alchimowicz meets Kuchcinski not far from his workplace, i.e. next to the Ministry of Public Security. He knows his place of residence and invites him to his flat. The situation, even for the conditions of the anti-communist conspiracy, which was very often built on family and community ties, looks bizarre to say the least. The moment of recruitment is a double recruitment. Kuchciński recruits Alchimowicz as a WiN collaborator, and Alchimowicz recruits Kuchciński as a Secret Security Office collaborator.

Perhaps it's a cover-up?

I would agree with the thesis that the idea of double recruitment is to create a cover for contacts between gentlemen. It would be quite a good idea. The only problem is that Alchimowicz carries Kuchciński's undertaking to the director of Department III of the MBP, Józef Czaplicki. And this is already the thing that should show all historians that something is wrong here. Stanislaw Kuchciński is not a Secret UB Collaborator who is supposed to collect information in the field of fisheries, and I will remind you that he was employed by the Fisheries Board. He is fully identifiable by Czaplicki as a member of the WiN Central Area Command, and for Czaplicki's purposes, immediately after his recruitment, he prepares notes concerning WiN activists Kazimierz Czarnocki and Wincenty Kwieciński. This shows that this situation is dramatically impure.

Do you find any other explanation for this situation?

Either both men were complete idiots - which I do not believe - or they are taking part in an operational combination in which they consider each other to be the actual conspirators. That is, neither of them is aware that they are both taking part in an operational combination of the security ministry - because that was the rule when it came to operational activities. Let us also note a certain redirection of Kuchcinski's interest from the moment the recruitment of Czarnocki takes place.

What happens then?

In all probability, at the end of June (1946), Czarnocki is secretly arrested in Łódź and his cooperation with the security services begins. A few weeks later, Kuchciński renews his contact with Tadeusz Płużański. When the department gains access to the WiN Central Area Command through Czarnocki, Kuchciński's role in the crackdown on the WiN Central Area Command ceases to be leading. As well as Alchimowicz. The priority becomes maintaining contact and working out Witold Pilecki's network. Let us draw attention to one more element, which seems to prove the participation of both men in the operational combination of the Ministry.

What element is this?

The idea, whose author was most probably Alchimowicz, of carrying out the liquidation of the top MBP officials. The idea was conveyed to Kwieciński in the autumn of 1946 by "Bigl", i.e. by Stanisław Kuchciński. The liquidation of Deputy Minister Roman Romkowski, Józef Różański and Józef Czaplicki is considered. Details of their place of residence are given.

Carrying out such an action was feasible?

The problem is that these ideas at the end of 1946 smell of an obvious provocation by the secret services. The WiN Central Area Command has no armed cell at its disposal to carry out this action. Suggesting to Kwieciński the execution of such actions is aimed at building a motive for a future indictment that he commanded an organisation which planned terrorist acts of liquidation.

Another element that seems to me to confirm these theses is the behaviour of the two men at the time of the liquidation of the Third WiN Board in January 1947. The logical behaviour, when there is a fall of basically all the members of the area command, should be, if you are a genuine conspirator, to run away. Nothing of the sort occurs. It is then that Kuchciński puts Płużański in contact with Alchimowicz, extending Alchimowicz's supposedly authentic cooperation with the conspiratorial structures in this case with Pilecki's intelligence network. This does not hold up to any logic.

Unfortunately, no.

Let us draw attention to a motif appearing in the report of 30 April 1947 by Kazimierz Czarnocki, who, as the main agent, led the infiltration and complete dismantling of the Third Main Board of WiN. Czarnocki appears in the field with the legend of an alleged escape from the Security Ministry, treats Kuchciński as a real conspirator and in the contacts between them Alchimowicz and the plan to escape abroad appear. This thing has to be considered not literally, but in terms of what benefit the security ministry would have from this idea. And the idea is to find out whether Pilecki's network has metastasis channels to the West and to work out this channel.

The idea of the alleged escape being authored by Czarnocki or Kuchcinski also appears in Alchimowicz's testimony. The last element I put forward to prove my thesis is Alchimowicz's attitude in the investigation. He tells everything about his activities. He has nothing to hide. A bizarre situation.

Not even trying to defend himself?

No. This is the attitude of a man who has an unwritten agreement with the ministry that he will get the death penalty and be pardoned or move to the position of a so-called illegal with a new identity. The fact that Kuchcinski is killed is also no proof that the Ministry of the Public Security (MBP) was not involved in this operational combination. There are dozens of examples of liquidating people who were no longer needed by the communist system. The fact that a search was carried out in his flat is building his credibility. A similar raid was made on Czarnocki's house. The impression was created that he was a genuinely wanted person in a situation where he was already an agent.

Actions needed to backlog agents.

And not just any agents of the Security Office. We are talking about people taking part in one of the most important MBP operational combinations concerning the dismantling of the strongest structure of the anti-communist underground, i.e. the Central Area of WiN, and later the Third Main Board of WiN. For reasons we do not know, the security ministry decided to give full cover to Czarnocki. It was considered that his merits and the possibility of later exploitation were so valuable that it was necessary to liquidate all those who could say anything about this betrayal. To these two figures, i.e. Kuchciński and Alchimowicz, I would also add Zbigniew Zakrzewski "Bryla", the head of intelligence of the Łódź District of WiN, and Czesław Stachura, an authentic WiN "snitch" in the Office of Public Security in Łódź. These were the people who knew about this betrayal and both men received the death penalty on an ad hoc basis.

– interviewed by Tomasz Plaskota
– Translated by Tomasz Krzyżanowski

TVP WEEKLY. Editorial team and jornalists

Tomasz Łabuszewski, PhD, is a historian, author and co-author of publications on the independence underground. Head of the Branch Historical Research Office of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw.