After the Russian attack on Ukraine many Greek Catholics found themselves, as refuges, in Poland. How many? It’s difficult to say. If we assume that the percentage is close to the national indicator, it could be around 100,000 migrants. However, since it was mainly people from western Ukraine who came to Poland in the first place, the number is most probably much higher.

Meanwhile, only a few years ago the entire GC Church in Poland consisted of two dioceses and no more than 130 parishes – mostly in northern Masuria and Warmia and in western Poland – served by 80 priests. Except that already before the war broke out, many economic migrants from Ukraine would arrive in Poland. Therefore new parishes were established – of course with the help of the Roman Catholic Church, which shared its premises or provided chapels. A small group of clergymen was also “imported” from Ukraine.

Now, in view of this huge influx of refugees, the needs have increased dramatically. While the GC hierarchy initially estimated that ca. 20% of the migrants sought contact with the Church (ca. 200,000 people), now the number has increased rapidly (it could be at least 0,5 million in total) while the duty to give concrete help has overwhelmed the hitherto organisational capacities of the Greek Catholics. New parishes and pastoral centres began to be established.

SIGN UP TO OUR PAGE And once again, “Roman” Catholics gave a helping hand. In the pastoral letter for Great Lent the Archbishop Stanisław Budzik, ordinary of Lublin, announced the handing over of St Josaphat’s Church in Zielona Street in Lublin to the Greek Catholics. In his letter, the Archbishop drew attention to the fact that there are numerous churches in the city centre so sharing one of them wouldn’t hinder the liturgy for the faithful, while it could help the 30-year-old GC parish in Lublin to solve pastoral problems.

It is precisely in Poland that a particular rapprochement is taking place between the two Catholic confessions: the Greek Catholics and the “Latin-riters” as the Ukrainians would put it. The faithful of the GC Church also celebrated Easter at Jasna Góra. In any case, since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine the Sanctuary of Jasna Góra has been an important place of prayer for refugees. It is visited not only by those who have found refuge in Częstochowa, but also elsewhere. The Greek Catholic “Divine Liturgy” is celebrated every Sunday.

There are also Orthodox Christians in Poland, landing both in cities where there are Orthodox churches – and to towns which are very far from them. Many of them naturally landed in Catholic temples – e.g. in Bielsko-Biała, Orthodox masses are celebrated in a Catholic church.

On the other hand, those who attend masses in churches that have existed for a long time are surprised by the reluctance of the hierarchy of the Polish Orthodox Church towards the new Ukrainian Church, and by the long-term ties of Polish clergy with the Moscow Patriarchate. In the longer term, the influx of refugees from Ukraine may lead to changes in Polish Orthodoxy, but that’s another topic.

Three Orthodox, Two Catholic Churches

In the past, three Orthodox Churches, as well as the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic Churches, operated in independent Ukraine. The very strong “Moscow” Church was hostile to Catholics of both rites, and in addition Greek Catholics often sharply argued with the “Latin-riters”. Everything has changed recently. The “Muscovites” are disappearing, and the new, independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church has good relations with Catholics. There are also chances for a better understanding between the Uniates and the “Roman” Catholics, especially since they belong to the same Catholic Church.

According to the latest research by the Razumkov Centre, only 9.6% of believing Ukrainians belong to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). While this rate amounts to 38.2% in the west of the country, it doesn’t exceed 1.2% in the rest of it. In turn, according to the local statistical office, in Lviv Greek Catholics account for 49% of its population, and Catholics only for 1%.

One way or another, the situation for Greek Catholics in the three western oblasts – Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk, i.e. in the so-called Eastern Galicia – was (and is) quite different from that in the rest of Ukraine. Where there are few of them, i.e. east of the Zbrucz river line, they cooperate very well with the RC Church, often using parish rooms and celebrating masses in temples.

It is worth noting, by the way, that the RC Church in Ukraine isn’t Polish at all, although many local Poles believe so. In Kiev, most of the masses in the largest and oldest temples, St. Alexander and St. Nicholas, are celebrated in Ukrainian.

Ukrainian, that is Greek Catholic

Ukrainians who are Greek Catholics believe – sometimes saying it out loud – that in fact it their Church alone was and is genuinely Ukrainian. They considered the Roman Catholic Church to be Polish (because it is so in the west of this country, masses are said in Polish), and Orthodoxy was dominated for a long time by the Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate.

And it is the Greek Catholics in Eastern Galicia who are strongly oppose celebrating mass in the Ukrainian language in “Roman” churches. They also do not want to return the Catholic churches they have seized. Poles are outraged that, for example, the beautiful Church of St. Mary Magdalene in Lviv is still officially functioning as the Lviv Organ Hall, and the Catholic community is unsuccessfully demanding the return of the temple confiscated by the communist authorities in 1962. The faithful have the right to use their church only on specific days and hours. This is so, although the decision on the church’s return depends on the Ukrainians sitting in the municipal authorities, primarily Greek Catholics.

However, these tensions have receded into the background due to Russian aggression. It is therefore difficult to predict what the ultimate solution to disputes will be. Especially that for the Greek Catholics, not only the west of the country is important, but the whole of Ukraine – the seat of the head of this Church, Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, is the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ in Kiev, built in 2013 (previously it had been St. George’s Cathedral in Lviv).

And on a national scale, relations with Roman Catholics are very good. Probably also because in the Ukrainian RC episcopate, out of 13 bishops, as many as eight come from Ukraine and only five from Poland, whereas before the majority were form our country. The former, however, seem to find it easier to talk about the most difficult matters (including those concerning a painful, common history) with their Ukrainian colleagues. President of the Ukrainian Episcopal Conference, Bp. Vitaliy Skomarovskyi, comes from Berdychiv, and currently heads the diocese of Lutsk, covering the whole of Volhynia.

Orthodoxy looking west

In the most important Ukrainian Orthodox churches subordinated to Moscow, there used to be a large poster depicting the “tree of Christianity”. A solid trunk, a dense, beautiful, green crown – this is Orthodoxy. The rotten offshoot is Catholicism. The black, narrow line represents Protestantism. This is how the “Moscow” Orthodox perceived themselves and others.

Before Ukraine’s independence, Orthodox Christians - the majority of the country’s population - belonged to the Russian Church. Then Ukrainian Orthodoxy split – for the next few years there was a church under the Moscow Patriarchate, a newly established Kiev Patriarchate (considered non-canonical by many Orthodox churches, including the Polish one) and a small autocephalous church “imported” from Canada.

But in 2018, a new Orthodox Church of Ukraine was created, which received a special document from the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, the so-called tomos, granting it autocephaly. The “Russian” Church was trying (at least formally) to cut itself off from Moscow, but this could not save it. Ukrainian services conducted extensive searches in the buildings belonging to this Church, finding evidence of cooperation between its hierarchs and the Russian aggressor. “The time has come to free ourselves from the rule of Moscow”, said the head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), Metropolitan Epiphanius, during the Christmas liturgy in the Holy Dormition Cathedral in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. The Moscow Patriarchate, which had owned the Lavra for years, was deprived of it.

And the new Ukrainian Church looks west rather than east. – We are open to dialogue with the Catholic Church and the Holy See – said Metropolitan Epiphanius in October last year. – We understand that time is needed for this, as the Holy See has had stable relations with the Russian Orthodox Church so far. Time is needed so that we can gradually build such relationships. In fact, they are already developing. For instance, through my (…) stay in Poland and meetings with Polish bishops. The visit of the delegation of the Polish episcopate in June this year was of great importance for building relations between our Church and the RC Church. in Kiev. And it was attended by the President of the Episcopate, Abp. Stanisław Gądecki, the Primate of Poland – Abp. Wojciech Polak, and the Metropolitan of Lublin, Abp. Stanisław Budzik, he added. And he emphasized: “In Ukraine, we have very good and friendly relations with both the RC and GC Churches”.

The symbol of the pro-Western attitude of the new Church is the decision that on September 1 it will officially switch to the new style, i.e. the Gregorian calendar. This was decided by the Council of Bishops of the OCU at its meeting in Kiev on 24 May, approving the information presented by Metropolitan Epiphanius the day before at the meeting of the Holy Synod of this Church.

What dialogue?

All this means that a new opportunity for Polish-Ukrainian dialogue has emerged. Indeed; the presidents and leading politicians of both countries have been running it for years and have repeatedly asserted historic reconciliation. Unfortunately, this was not necessarily reflected in the mood and behaviour of societies. The widespread Polish support for the “Orange Revolution” (2004-2005) melted away because there was no one to turn it into lasting cooperation. More or less the same happened with sympathy for the Maidan – the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine (2013-2014).

Now, the Poles are supporting Ukrainian resistance against the Russian invasion, and the Ukrainians are grateful for the help they received, which can be seen, for example, in opinion polls – Poland enjoys great sympathy in Ukraine. Also in this case, it is difficult to say whether this agreement can be permanent (especially since history still divides us). But if it comes to the cooperation of religious institutions, which after all have a considerable impact on societies, this may change.

Without overestimating the role of the churches, it should be said that the message coming from the “pulpit” – figuratively speaking – may have much greater resonance in the societies of both countries than the official positions of politicians. If, for example, the Catholic, Greek Catholic and Orthodox hierarchies engage in reconciliation over a common, painful history, average citizens will perceive it differently than even the best and thrilling speeches of the presidents of both countries. Because they will hear about it from their priests, in their churches, and not from the media. And it seems that the Polish and Ukrainian bishops have already understood this.

– Piotr Kościński
– Translated by Dominik Szczęsny-Kostanecki

TVP WEEKLY. Editorial team and jornalists