TVP WEEKLY: In which direction is Georgia striving today, in the times of the great confrontation between Europe and Russia?

PROF. ALEXANDER MIKABERIDZE: Thank you for your question. I want to note that I have not visited Georgia in several years and must draw conclusions based on what I observe, read, and discuss from afar. Nevertheless, there is much to say about the direction in which Georgia is moving. The events of the last two weeks have shown us that a significant part of the Georgian society desires a course towards integration within the wider European community. Such an aspiration is, by the way, enshrined in our Constitution and I would encourage your listeners to take a look at Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which explicitly states that the government is responsible for finding ways to achieve full integration into the European Union and the NATO. That is the goal the Georgian nation has set itself and that it be must fulfilled, for Georgian future is in the European community. The policies of Georgia’s current government do make me wonder about its commitment to this course, but I do hope that the events of the past two weeks would serve as a wakeup call.

The attitude of the Tbilisi government toward the war in Ukraine is ambiguous. They do not stand against aggression like Poland or the Baltic states did. Maybe you do not remember the events from 2008 when the Polish president symbolically stands against Russia in Georgia.

Trust me, in Georgia, we all still remember Mr. Lech Kaczynski! Who can forget him arriving, alongside the Ukrainian president and the leaders of the Baltic states, in the midst of our war against Russia? Who can forget the speech that he gave in front of our Parliament, demonstrating solidarity with Georgia and making that famous warning, “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine...”? It is because of the memory of that day that I feel so uncomfortable when I see the Georgian government’s ambivalence nowadays; when I see our leaders not showing the same level of commitment and solidarity with the Ukrainian people in their struggle against Russia. The Georgian government seems to be pursuing a policy of, as we say it in Georgia, trying to sit on two chairs at once. On one hand, it seeks closer military cooperation and integration with the Western partners, and the Georgian army is probably the most integrated Georgian institution in this regards. But on the other hand, we see the government’s willingness to turn a blind eye to Russia bordering on subservience, all the while making unfounded, event laughable, claims against European partners. Some of the things that the Georgian political leaders state cannot but raise eyebrows. The Georgian prime minister’s recent interview is a good example of it. It is simply startling to listen to these outlandish claims and then comprehend who is making them! And then, of course, we have the situation of a billionaire oligarch almost single-handedly dominating the political scene and serving as an éminence grise of Georgian politics.

So who is pulling the strings in Georgia? Are there any connections to the Kremlin?

I have no desire to get into such political discussion, but it will suffice to state that it is widely known that Mr. Bidzina Ivanishvili has made his money in Russia and in the past has had close ties with Russian oligarchs, not to mention senior figures in the Russian government. Whether he still maintains such close ties or not is a moot point. It is impossible to create a functioning democratic state when one man exercises such influence over society and pulls so many strings. So yes, I am rather critical of the current government, and many of its current policies, be it its stance on Russia’s war in Ukraine, the outlandish claims of the „West” wanting to „drag Georgia into the war”, or legislative initiatives that look suspicious similar to Russian ones. Things have got to change in Georgia.

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     And what about the feelings of the Georgian people?

There is considerable public support for Ukraine, for seeking closer integration with EU and NATO. I would remind you that the Georgian Legion is fighting in Ukraine, hundreds of Georgian volunteers are there, while Georgian citizens, including myself, have donated tens of thousands of dollars, not to mention other charitable support, to make sure that Ukraine prevails in this struggle. So, I think there is clear disparity between what the government does and what the people aspire to do. But exploring this issue in detail would require a much longer answer than you probably do not have time for. It will suffice, probably, for me to say that some of the policies that the present government pursues are misguided. No one in Ukraine, Europe, or the US wants to involve Georgia in the war, so this whole claim of the Western conspiracy to open a second front in Georgia is just a nonsense.

So, should Georgia become neutral?

If you ask me, in today's world, Georgia does not have the luxury of being neutral next to the expansionist states like Russia. Looking at the past century, look how neutrality played out for the nations bordering Russia, and ask yourself can we afford reliving the past once more? The nation must make a choice, it must cast it die, and my preference would be, of course, for Georgia to seek a Western integration. There is very little that Russia can offer us in terms of future development, but there is a whole world to be gained elsewhere.

We'll come back to this historical issue in a moment, but I'd like to mention the other important figure of the 2008 events: Mikheil Saakashvili. Is he a martyr?

I do not see him as a martyr, but neither do I want former political leaders to be prosecuted and imprisoned, denied proper treatment. If Saakashvili is guilty of any offense, then let the judicial system examine such charges and the court decide on the basis of facts. And so far, after months of detention, we haven't seen anything tangible. Saakashvili has his share of accomplishments and failures, but his role in modern history of Georgia in undeniable.

Is he still important as a symbol for the Georgian people?

I do think so, at least for a certain part of the Georgian electorate. Back in the days when I worked at the Georgian foreign ministry, in the late 1990s, I remember him as a young, up-and-coming, politician who called for substantive reforms and changes. He went on to accomplish a great deal. During his first term in office, he was inspirational, I would even say transformative, figure, and the reforms that his administration introduced in early 2000s are fundamental to the creation of modern Georgian state. His restructuring of the police, military, and state institutions, the struggle against endemic corruption, implementation of free-market reforms, along with reform of healthcare system, education, and so on – all these changes are of great consequence. But I am also fully cognizant of the fact that Saakashvili’s presidency had a darker side too, including abuse of power, heavy handed policing and harassment of opponents, failure to create a truly independent judiciary, and so on.

If you compare him to another historical figure, who was so important to Georgia?

Not sure. Saakashvili is a modern politician and I struggle to find somebody from Georgia’s recent past that could be compared to him. We have had very few politicians of his stature, for example his predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze, but Saakashvili is a unique figure in many respects: young, charismatic, Western-educated, with good connections to the key power players in the West, fluency in foreign languages, determination to fight, and ability to raise Georgia's profile on the international stage. It will be interesting to see how history judges him in the end.

What will the future of the post-Soviet countries look like? They choose different strategies.

This is a complex question and I do not have a clear-cut answer to it, because I think there are substantive differences between these countries. On the one hand, we have the Baltic example of effective collaboration, building a civil society, and embracing a shared vision of economic development and European integration. Looking at how that was achieved in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, one cannot but feel envious, but of course this a feeling of healthy envy. I am delighted to see them building societies that are modern, vibrant, democratic, with bright future ahead. By contrast, the situation is wholly different in the Caucasus, where the three states have failed to overcome structural problems and long-standing challenges, and struggle to create something unique, something common. I cannot predict the future for Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan but I know what I would prefer it to be like – all three nations building open and democratic societies, similar to what the Baltic states have done. But this might be just a pipedream since I am aware of the existing problems, both within Georgia and in the Caucasus region as a whole, that pose major obstacles to seeing it fulfilled. Not the least of them is the volatile political and economic environment, the ongoing Russian occupation of Georgian territory and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, etc. These problems would keep us preoccupied for many years to come.

We talked about the post-imperial map of Europe. The subject connects the same history of Georgia and Poland. But let us go back in time to 200 years ago. You wrote a monumental book about the Napoleonic Wars. I never thought that Napoleon was important not only for Polish history but also for Georgian history...

Not only for Georgia. For me, the Napoleonic era is the history of imperial competitions between Britain, France, Russia, and other powers that unfolds not only within Europe but in many other parts of the world. In fact, as I point out in the book, discussing a global context to the Napoleonic Wars reveals that they had greater impact overseas as they did in Europe. Napoleon was, after all, defeated and his empire erased from the map of Europe. But the Napoleonic geopolitics reshaped the Middle East, South America, North America, Caribbean, and India. Some might be surprised to hear that these contests reached even such far-flung places as Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and even Hawaii, where the Russian and American interests clashed in 1815-1816. This is where I see the importance of this era. It is critical to the destiny of Europe, but we must be also mindful of its huge impact elsewhere. This was a conflict of an unprecedented intensity and scale, a world war indeed.

For Polish readers, Napoleon's involvement in the Caucasus is also an interesting geopolitical story.

But it should not be a surprising fact, since this was the period of the rapid expansion of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus. In 1801 Russia annexed the eastern Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and, preempting Napoleon’s decision against the Spanish monarchy in 1808, the Russian emperor had ordered the detention and exile of the Georgian royal house. Between 1804 and 1813, so in effect for the duration of the Napoleonic Wars, one of the conflict zones between European powers was indeed in the Caucasus, where Russia fought against the Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire, which, by the way, were supported, at various points, by the French and the British. In 1807, Napoleon was seriously exploring a possibility of creating the Triple Alliance of France, Ottoman Empire, and Iran to contain Russian aggrandizement. I find it particularly interesting that in 1812-1813 the British officers trained the Iranian troops to fight the Russians in the Caucasus just as British government was actively seeking Russian support against Napoleon in Europe. A good example of this is the battle of Aslanduz, which was fought in late October, just as Napoleon was retreating from Russia. So, my contention is that what happened in the Caucasus is part-and-parcel of the Napoleonic history.

And perhaps the loss of independence of Georgia?

You are right, that historic event is part of it too. Nowadays there is a rather raucous debate in Georgia about King Heraclius’ decision to sign an alliance treaty with Russia in 1783, an alliance that proved to be very consequential for Georgia. To start with, it precipitated a devastating invasion of Agha Muhammed Shah Qajar in 1795. Russian Empress Catherine II did nothing to help, and neither did her son Paul, or grandson Alexander. In fact, Paul and Alexander moved to annex the eastern Georgian kingdom. Georgia's position as a small country surrounded by great imperial powers meant that the Georgians had to find an ally. So, we see them reaching out to Napoleon for support. King Solomon II of Imereti, in western Georgia, wrote letters beseeching Napoleon for help, and so did also Georgian princes who had fled Russian annexation to Iran, and tried to resist by seeking French and British help in the fight against Russian imperialism. Ultimately, all their efforts proved in vain since Napoleon was eventually defeated. But throughout the Napoleonic Wars, if you look closely at geopolitical wrangling between Russia, France, Britain, Ottoman Empire, and the Qajar Iran, Georgia always figured in it.

Some of the Georgian names were the symbol of the Napoleonic defeat in Russia.

You are, of course, referring to Peter Bagration, probably the most famous Georgian of the Napoleonic era. He is a very interesting figure, part of the growing Georgian diaspora in the Russian empire. Bagration was a talented tactical commander, respected equally by friends and enemies alike. But he died after the severe injury he suffered at Borodino in September 1812. Other Georgians, however, carried on and did witness Napoleon’s defeat. As part of my research on the Russian officer corps, I identified about 70 high-ranking Georgian officers, who had served in the Russian army during the Napoleonic Wars: Generals Yashvil, Gangeblov, Shalikov, Zhevakhov, and others were all Georgians. By the way, there were Georgians also serving in Napoleon’s army – the famed Mamluks, some of whom were from Georgia. I am currently working on the biography of one of them, who was from my hometown of Tbilisi.

You know that if you prepare the ranking of the most popular foreigners in Poland, Bonaparte from the two centuries is at the top, but in your book, I've got the rather unknown quote from Bonaparte: "Did he really not want to be a Don Quixote of Poland?

I'd start by noting that Napoleon made that statement in the context of the long and difficult negotiations between Russia and France on the question of the future of imperial borderlands in Eastern Europe. The wider context, of course, is that of the infamous Polish partitions and the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was engineered by the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century. And as your listeners know, Napoleon’s decision to restore the Duchy of Warsaw was seen by the Russian government as the possible first step towards an eventual revival of Polish statehood, which would have been absolutely detrimental to the Russian interests; we all know how complicated Polish-Russian relations had been in previous centuries. So, in 1810-1811, Russia sought assurances from Napoleon that he would not do it, but Napoleon refused to grant them. Instead, he played a complicated game where he claimed he did not want to be ‘Don Quixote of Poland’ but also refused to give Russia any concrete assurances over Poland.

Overall, I find it particularly heartbreaking to contemplate the commitment of the Polish szlachta, Polish society, to the Napoleonic experiment. Think of thousands of soldiers and officers who served in Spain, think of those Polish officers who hoped that their loyal service would contribute to the revival of Polish statehood.

Unfortunately, he couldn’t change the history of Poland, but in your book, you prove that this 23-year-long period (1792-1815) created a new shape of the world. For example, the rising power of the West.

To a degree, Napoleon did change the history of Poland, although the Duchy of Warsaw that he created did not survive the fall of the empire. Still, many of political and legal institutions that he laid the foundation for survived. If I am not mistaken, the political institutions survived until 1831, the administrative reforms until the 1860s, while certain provisions of the Code Civil were in effect until after World War II. So his legacy in Poland is multilayered.

Napoleon did have an outsized impact on the world. Whether directly or indirectly, he became the architect of independent South America, played a role in reshaping the Middle East, strengthened British imperial ambitions on a global scale, and contributed to the rise of American power. The latter point is particularly important – at the start of the revolutionary wars, the United States was a fledgling republic, just a decade old, still unsure of its role and place in the wider world. So at first, the US was a reluctant participant, I would even say an observer, of the tribulations happening overseas. George Washington’s famous farewell address warned against foreign entanglements, and the US did remain neutral for most of this period. But Americans were clearly interested in exploiting the situation in Europe by trading with both sides, gaining profits, and expanding their economy. Such an approach did benefit the US greatly. Leaving aside financial benefits, I will just note one crucial gain - in 1803, Americans made what is probably the most important land deal in modern history when they negotiated the sale of the Louisiana Territory with Napoleon. This was a pivotal moment in American history, and I would venture to say, in modern history of the world, since this deal marked the end of the French colonial empire in the Western hemisphere and transformed the United States by not only doubling the size of its territory but also recasting the very sense of American national identity and place in the world. We still live with the consequences of that decision.

You are absolutely right to note the role of the Napoleonic wars in the rise of the West. By the time these wars were over, the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world had shifted fundamentally. The two-decade long conflict had stimulated European states to reform themselves; many, indeed, had been forced to adopt the principles advocated by the French, in order to beat Napoleon at his own game. Thus, one of the core legacies of this era lay in substantive transformation of European state power through centralization, greater proficiency of European bureaucracies, military recruitment, financial regulation, and tax-gathering that went hand in hand with measures to stimulate financial institutions and industrial transformation. In the post-Napoleonic period, military strength became inherently linked to administrative excellence, financial prowess, and industrial capacity in ways that the more restrictive state policies of non-European powers, be it China, Ottoman Empire, Qajar Iran, and Tokugawa-era Japan, did not allow. European, essentially British, command of the seas reinforced Europe’s new, more assertive, relationship with the rest of the world after 1815. It allowed Europeans to secure seaborne trade, to throttle rival manufacturing/commercial centers, and to colonize far-flung parts of the globe, where indigenous powers could not successfully confront the combined effects of Europe’s military, economic, industrial, and commercial ascendancy. The extent of Europe’s divergence over the rest of the world became ever clearer as the century progressed.

-interview by Cezary Korycki

TVP WEEKLY. Editorial team and journalists

Prof. Alexander Mikaberidze is a Georgian-American historian, and professor of history at Louisiana State University. He is the author of the newly published book "The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History," and “Kutuzov: A Life in War and Peace.”