"When the savages in Louisiana want fruit, they cut down the tree by the very ground and pick it. That is the essence of despotism." (Montesquieu)

Montesquieu wronged "the savages in Louisiana", but he accurately described the essence of despotism and the character of people raised in despotism. "The savages in Louisiana" let us replace "the savages of Russia" and the rest of the description becomes adequate. Ukraine is a good example of this. How did this happen? Let us just go back over three decades, i.e. from the collapse of the USSR.

WAR IN UKRAINE

The USSR was formally a federation of three sovereign states represented in the UN: Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. On 8 December 1991, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine and the chairman of the Supreme Council of Belarus signed an agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, thus dissolving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Baltic republics - Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia - did not join the CIS. br>
President Boris Yeltsin saw in the CIS a vehicle for rebuilding the neo-Soviet Union on a new basis, with him as head of state. The vehicle turned out to be a weak basis for rebuilding the "federation". Georgia withdrew from the CIS in 2009, Ukraine in 2018. The remaining states have retained a significant degree of independence from the Russian Federation.

Russia has secured outposts to control some of them - it has torn Abkhazia and then South Ossetia from Georgia, Transnistria from Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh has been turned into an instrument of control over Armenia and Azerbaijan. Central Asia temporarily became a condominium jointly supervised by Russia and China.

Russia has never given up on Belarus and Ukraine. With the former it went relatively easily. Ukraine was a bigger problem In 1994, on the occasion of a conference in Berlin, I asked one of the wiser Russian specialists in international affairs about the barriers to good relations between Russia and Poland. He replied that every meeting between representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian governments makes the Kremlin nervous. I noted that Poland cares about the political stability of Ukraine and its economic development, but also about good relations between Russia and Ukraine, which is reflected in Polish policy. He took note of this, but did not take a stand. br>
In short, isolating Ukraine, preventing it from joining cooperation with the West, was a priority for Russia from the outset. The political stability and economic development of Ukraine were therefore also seen as a threat to Russian imperial interests. There is an irresolvable contradiction between the Polish raison d'état and Russian imperial aspirations.

There was no success

Russia's elite in the 1990s believed in the chance of rebuilding the economy in cooperation with the West and based on revenues from the oil and gas sector. In the West, too, these intentions met with a positive response in the form of an influx of investment and political support.

Moscow's mistake was in choosing the wrong transformation strategy. The privatisation of large state enterprises by the 'coupon' method was an effective way of transferring enterprises into private hands, but it had the side effect of creating a powerful lobby in the form of a group of dozens of olidarchs with enormous wealth. The source of this richness was the acquisition of control over natural resources and their processing. br>
The oligarchs used their wealth for ostentatious consumption and to buy properties in the West. Thus, funds that could have served as a basis for building a modern processing industry and creating a healthy basis for the Russian economy were used to create a class of freeloaders.

The Russians should have started by rebuilding the state, creating a competent administration, a decent legal system and a functioning judiciary. This would have made it possible to avoid the plundering of public property by the political elite and the leadership of the secret services as well as ordinary criminals, and in any case to avoid large-scale social demoralisation.

Whether post-communist Russia, with its human potential destroyed by more than seventy years of communist dictatorship, was capable of this is another matter. In any case, it was not tried.

The optimism of the elite was accompanied by the belief that Russia would be more important to the West than the former satellite countries, allowing it to maintain a minimum of control over this area. This was expressed by Boris Yeltsin when he stated that Russia's aim was for its relations with NATO to be closer than those of the other post-communist states.

If this was achievable, it was on condition of success in rebuilding the state and the economy. But there was no success. Gradually, the West began to see that things were not going as they hoped. Nevertheless, until the arrival of the post-Keltsin succession, there were elements of democracy in Russia, freedom of speech, elections to the Duma, etc.

Creating a monster

After Boris Yeltsin stepped down, Vladimir Putin, his anointed leader, won the presidential election. His election victory was preceded by a series of terrorist attacks that left several hundred people dead. Officially, the perpetrators were identified as Chechens. From the outset, however, it has been claimed, supported by strong circumstantial evidence, that the FSB and Putin themselves were behind these attacks.

In August 2000, a nuclear-powered submarine sank. 118 people died in the disaster. Putin did not accept the offer of foreign help in the rescue operation and did not even interrupt his holiday. In October 2002, Chechen terrorists seized the Dubrovka theatre during a performance. In the operation to "free" the hostages, 173 people were killed, including 133 hostages. In September 2004, Chechen terrorists seized, during a lesson, a school in Beslan. In the operation to "liberate" the hostages, mostly children, 334 people were killed and about 700 were wounded.

In 2008, Russian troops invaded Georgia and, six years later, they attacked Ukraine, occupying Crimea and providing military support to separatists in the south-east of that country. In the meantime there was the 'pacification' of Chechnya, in which around 20% of the population of that country died. The current Russian aggression, which is being carried out without any regard for human losses and suffering, and which is wantonly destroying the country's infrastructure, is the next step in the plan to rebuild the empire.

These facts must be recalled when one hears statements by European and non-European politicians that Putin's personality has changed in the last few years, whereas previously he was an open, amiable man with whom one could communicate. And they communicated on issues that served his intentions. Gerhard Schröder, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi were particularly easy to communicate with Putin. Barack Obama wanted to repair relations with him, and George W. Bush, having looked deeply into his eyes, saw a sincere Democrat.

How is it possible that, knowing the facts that demonstrate this man's lack of empathy and any moral resistance, otherwise intelligent people could be so wrong? One can speculate on this. It is enough here to say that, in its carelessness, the West has contributed to the creation of a monster. With a wise policy, it could have been stopped earlier, but nobody tried to do so.

One of the favourite topics in intellectual discussions in recent weeks concerns Putin's ability to think rationally. Theorists of neorealism in international relations, argue that Putin is behaving rationally, and that whatever he did wrong was caused by blunders in Western policy. One can agree with such a general view, but not with its particularity. For, according to these people, the West has needlessly irritated Russia by expanding NATO or giving economic aid to Ukraine. The West should recognise Russia's right to enslave its neighbours.

However, if the essence of the West is international order, based on civilised rules of play, then such concessions would mean giving up all the achievements of successive generations that have built the West over the centuries, as well as the foundations of American hegemony in the world. Perhaps this is rational, as long as one dislikes the West, America and people in general.

On Putin's shoulders

Together with the Chinese, Putin's Russia has formed an alliance that supports authoritarian dictatorships everywhere and fights against neighbouring democratic states. Venezuela, Central Africa, Syria, etc.: everywhere we find the economic and also the political-military presence of these two countries. The difference between Russia and China is that, while China is a symbol of economic success achieved with the strong support of the West, Russia is a descending power, 'a petrol station equipped with a nuclear bomb', as John McCain neatly put it.

Similar alliances have occurred throughout history. The specificity of this one is that its basis is the removal, or at least weakening, of US influence in the Asia-Pacific, on the one hand, and in Europe, on the other. Both countries have revanchist territorial claims on their neighbours: China wants to regain the lands of the former empire and control East Asia; Russia wants to reclaim control of the former USSR area.

By the way, Eastern Siberia came under Russian rule at the end of the 19th century under 'unjust treaties' which the Chinese were forced to sign by the authorities of Tsarist Russia. Surely, in due course, the Chinese will demand its return. Will a nuclear bomb be enough for a gas station to defend itself against such a demand?

Theoretically speaking, Russia could have directed itself politically towards the West. Based on Western institutions and its own remarkable social capital and natural resources, it could have built a modern economy. With such a strategy it could, like China, become within a few decades one of the most politically and economically attractive states in the world. Its international position, especially with close relations with Germany, would be significant. In the region of East Asia, Russia would be the tongue in cheek in a system of regional balances. All this is outdated. It has now reached a dead end.

Was such an option viable thirty years ago? One can doubt it. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms came under conditions when the entire apparatus of power had already decayed organisationally and morally. Boris Yeltsin and his associates were not the team that could find a way out of this situation. In any case, self-interest rather than Russia's interest was their priority. Vladimir Putin came to power with the support of circles that had "not quite legally" made great fortunes in the first decade of the new Russia. That is, 'siloviki', i.e. KGB colleagues who think only about money, and ordinary criminals.

If so, the chance of rebuilding a stable state within Russia is unlikely. The whole thing hangs on Putin's shoulders, and there are no people around him capable, morally, intellectually, and with access to the material resources necessary to carry out such an operation. Whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia as we know it today is coming to an end. The problem is that it is destroying everything around it. The most important question is how to avoid that?

Hope in China

The cement of the Russo-Chinese alliance is hostility towards the West, in particular, towards the state on which the system of global institutions is based - the United States. It is a tactical alliance. It would seem that it is up to Putin to wait patiently until Beijing makes a mistake and launches aggression against Taiwan. And then, express sympathy and political support, for example, by refraining from condemning Beijing in votes at the UN Security Council, and by promoting information full of understanding for its partner's position. That is, to do the same thing that China is currently doing towards Russia.

In short, Putin has overbid and lost. In this situation, he may adopt a "flood after me" attitude and use measures that could lead to an unimaginable world catastrophe. This can be prevented either by an internal coup d'état or by the intervention of Putin's friend, Xi Jinping, who has greater ambitions than destroying everything around him.

In the first case, the scale of the internal protests would have to force the more liberal parts of Putin's elite to take an active role in overthrowing the ruler. In the second case, China has the right to intervene because in its partnership agreement with Ukraine, it pledged to come to its aid in the event of a nuclear attack.

Meanwhile, a tragic war is taking place in Ukraine, and the future of the world depends on its outcome. For the time being, all we know is that 'a wild boar has decided to reach for the fruit and, to this end, is trying to cut down a tree close to the ground'.

– Antoni Kamiński
– Translated by Tomasz Krzyżanowski

Antoni Z. Kamiński is a sociologist, professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Science. Positions held: April 1 - June 30 1998 Government representative in charge of the Program of Institutional Enforcement; Feb.1.1994- Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Professor and Head of the Section of International Security & Strategic Studies; Oct.1.1991-Dec. 31, 1992, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Director and Professor; Feb. 1 - Dec. 31, 1993, Department of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense, Director; Nov.1990-Jan 31, 1993, Department of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, v-Director; 1984-1990 Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Director. Selected academic positions and functions: 2008-2010 “Management of the Energy Resources, and National Security of Poland”, Joint Research Project of the Institute of Political Studies and Bureau on National Security at the office of the President of Poland – head of the Project; 2005-2008 Research project on “Poland’s and Region’s Security from the Global Perspective” - head of the Project; 2006 Visitor Professor of Politics & Laporte Visiting Professor, Princeton University, spring semester; 2001-2005 Centre for European and Transatlantic Studies, European Humanities University in Minsk, Belarus, Member of the Advisory Board.