According to a popular saying, generals wage past wars which means they expect similar results in similar circumstances – because they don’t take into consideration that the resemblance may be misleading. Let us take the example of Napoleon’s leaders in Spain: they couldn’t learn that the column attack, inherited from the wars of the Revolution, was doomed to failure in a clash with the expanded formation of the British infantry (equipped with more rapid-fire rifles).

However, it is impossible to learn how to command in isolation from content – as Kant would have put it – otherwise thoughts are empty. Therefore, military science must be studied and taught according to the analysis of the great campaigns of world history: those of Themistocles, Hunyadi, Sobieski, Napoleon, etc.

In the context of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation from Russian aggression, historical intuition prompts more than one thing (for instance, the desired parallel with the Polish-Bolshevik War) but before looking for useful history lessons it is necessary to pay attention to some preliminary conditions that rationalise the whole undertaking.

First, they should be “hot” conflicts, i.e. kinetic ones (that is to say involving the use of lethal weapons). Second, they should be modern in the sense that most technological developments can be found in both wars. Third, for such a comparison to be reasonable at all, they should involve modern nations, in many ways being a game changer in juxtaposition with earlier eras: demographically, ideologically and even psychologically. Fourthly and finally: the comparison should however be made between those conflicts that, regardless of their kinetic scale, have a global dimension. Therefore – although this thesis is open to debate – the most appropriate for this purpose are the two wars that have been given the qualifier “world”.

The Great War: Kyiv like Paris?

After 16 months of war, the most obvious association is this: Russia has assumed the role of Wilhelmine Germany, Ukraine – that of the III French Republic. Because indeed, the seize of Paris, which was supposed to be a piece of cake (“home before the leaves fall”) as according to the first part of the Schlieffen Plan (field marshal Afred von Schlieffen was the main author of the plan to invade France) ended in a fiasco as did the direct capture of Kyiv, a plan devised in detail by general Valery Gierasimov, the Russian chief of staff. In both cases, too, the defeat was close – which is hardly remembered in Poland in relation to the French capital.

At the critical moment, the German cavalry units were approaching within 20 kilometers of the city. 108 years later, the Russians captured the northern suburbs of Kyiv – and it is scary to think what would have happened if the Ukrainians had not managed to dislodge them from the airport in Hostomel and stop the attack of the 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade near Makarov (after the operation failed, the commanding officer was assassinated by his own soldiers).

The main difference is that while in the years 1914-1918 the Germans did not fundamentally modify their plan of war against France (which, by the way, does not reflect well on their military imagination), the Russians, by the end of the first decade of April, having withdrawn from Kyiv or more broadly – from the whole of northern and north-eastern Ukraine, i.e. from the Chernihiv and Sumy regions – began, on the one hand, to use dispersed terror against the civilian population, and, on the other hand, to concentrate their military efforts in Donbas: in this context, the last chord of the “shortening” of the front was the November evacuation of Kherson, the only provincial city they captured in this war.

However, if you look at the German war on the Western Front – not with the battle for Kyiv, but with the situation in Donbas – the similarity comes back with great force. The symbol of the attempt to break the impasse by the Germans is the battle of Verdun, by the Allies – of the Somme. Both took place in 1916 and you can choose from them freely. Both recall the first Battle of Bakhmut. The first, because a second is now in progress.

The consequence of such a positional war – in contrast to the manoeuvre clash near Kyiv – is getting bogged down in a war of attrition, both in terms of mobilisation potential and equipment. In the first aspect, the Russians have and will probably continue to have an advantage, which is basically obvious, since it is unlikely that the Ukrainians will be joined on the battlefield by a significant contingent from outside. The Ukrainians must avoid a repeat of the French trench warfare.

The Great War: Russia like Wilhelmine Germany?

Only seemingly contemporary Russia – Moscovia, as proposed by President Zelenskyy – does not wage war on two fronts, which happened to Wilhelmine Germany (although it does not lead it in two directions in the military dimension). Apart from Kazakhstan’s “separatist” movements, there is an almost existential Chinese threat, the stake of which is, or rather was, dominance in Asia.

The only asymmetry that Russia could still use against China to its advantage is the huge, 11-fold advantage of the active nuclear arsenal (according to a report by the Swedish think tank SIPRI, the ratio of the number of warheads is 4489 to 410). Meanwhile, Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on the Middle Kingdom – gas exports to this country alone have already reached 15.5 billion cubic meters in 2022, which is an increase by half (49%)! And it’s not that this addiction works both ways. China can buy gas elsewhere, while Russia has virtually nowhere to sell it.

When it comes to figures... The Entente countries spent 57.7 billion then dollars on WW I (of which the British & Americans spent 40.1 billion, almost 70% of the total: expressed in today’s money it’s $1500 billion altogether), winning the war against the Triple Alliance which “splashed out” with 24.7 billion or 42% of their enemies’ effort. In other words: 5:2 for the winners. And today? During one year of Russian aggression (until Feb 24, 2023) the US alone helped Ukraine with $ 76.8 billion which is practically the same amount as Russia’s total military expenditure of $ 86.4 billion.

But after all, also working in Ukraine’s favour is the money granted to it by, among others: the EU institutions (EUR 30 billion), the UK (EUR 10 billion), Germany (EUR 7 billion), Poland (according to Finance Minister Magdalena Rzeczkowska – EUR 6.4 billion), Japan (EUR 5 billion), or Canada (USD 8 billion) – which together, when reduced to a common denominator, adds up to another USD 70 billion.

It can therefore be seen that, after taking into account inaccuracies, hidden Russian influence, and the contribution of other countries providing aid to Ukraine etc., the spending ratio of the victors of the First World War –let us recall: 5:2 – has either already been achieved in the current conflict or will soon be. And Russia, like Germany at the time, does not have large financial reserves.

World War II: Ukraine like Finland

In the case of WWII, a comparison with the Soviet-Finnish war, waged from the end of November 1939 to March 1940 seems to be the most justified at first sight. In terms of human resources the Finns were outnumbered three to one by the attacking Red Army; in tanks the Soviet advantage was eighty to one. Kliment Voroshilov, the people’s commissar (minster) of defence was ensuring Stalin that the war would be short and victorious. He was supported in this by the Soviet propagandist-in-chief Andrei Zhdanov while the famous composer Dmitri Shostakovich wrote a special suite which was to be performed at the Red Army’s victory parade in Helsinki.

In the case of the Winter War – as it is referred to – there are many similarities with the current Russian-Ukrainian war. Firstly, although the Soviet army was numerically strong (1.5 million soldiers in 1938, with plans to expand to 6.5 million in the event of war), it proved to be ill-prepared and its equipment (tanks, planes) although very numerous was of very poor quality. The contemporary Russian army was supposed to be the second most powerful army in the world – but it is unable to defeat the Ukrainian army, which is in the second ten of this ranking.

Finland received a lot of foreign support, mainly political, as Soviet aggression was widely recognized as unjustified. Volunteers came to this country – almost 9,000 Swedes, a thousand Danes and over 700 Norwegians. The Swedes gave the Finns a fighter squadron and anti-aircraft guns. The Allies planned an intervention in this war – the Polish Independent Highland Brigade, among others, was getting ready for this purpose. But in the end the Allied forces didn’t participate in the whole thing because by the time they were prepared and dispatched, the war was over. Eventually, the Finns lost, but the Soviets achieved no victory at all. The former lost 26,000 people, while the Red Army, according to various estimations, up to 170,000 (plus about 200,000 injured and suffering from frostbites).

Moscow did not draw any conclusions from the course of aggression against Poland after September 17, 1939; wherever the Poles defended themselves (Vilnius, Grodno, Kodziowce, Szack, Sarny) they inflicted heavy losses on the Soviets. Moreover, it did not learn from the Winter War, because the German attack in 1941 found the Red Army badly prepared. You can try to find an analogy with the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, which showed the terrible logistic preparation of Russian operations – for example, Russian officers communicated with each other via mobile phones using the Georgian network. Expert opinions before February 2022 were clear: the Russians understood their mistakes from the war in Georgia and made a deep reform of the army. Except that apparently this reform was either simulated or very limited.

In November 1939, the Finnish commander, general (later marshal) Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, turned out to be an excellent commander-in-chief, while the Soviet Marshal Kliment Voroshilov – a terrible commander. But Voroshilov also personally contributed to the weakening of the Red Army, by agreeing to the gigantic purges in the army in 1937-38. Three out of five marshals of the USSR were killed, so were all commanders in the rank of 1st and 2nd class komandarm, as well as in the komkor rank (i.e. all generals!). Although there were no such purges in contemporary Russia, there have been and still are other, dramatically unfavorable phenomena, including, in particular, gigantic corruption. And the hopeless failure to inform the highest authorities about the situation in the army.

In addition, the planning failed – a bit like in November 1939. Convinced of their power, the Soviets then attacked in several directions, hoping for a quick win. It was very much the same a year ago – Russia dispersed its forces, attacking in several places at the same time, which is technically called a cordon attack. Both in both cases hoped for an instant victory. It was a mistake then and now.

World War II: Kyiv like Moscow

Of course, you can try to make other parallels as well. In Soviet and Russian historiography, the Soviets won the “Great Patriotic War”, i.e. the Soviet-German war during WWII, thanks to their moral superiority, determination, courage and excellent leadership. Meanwhile, under the so-called Lend-Lease programme, the United States sent to the USSR: 427,000 cars, 22,000 aircraft, 13,000 tanks, 9,000 tractors, 2,000 locomotives, 11,000 wagons and 3 million tons of aviation gasoline. Deliveries of 142,000 tons of steel, 13.800 tons of nickel and 16.900 tons of molybdenum concentrate allowed the USSR to produce about 45,000 tanks. This was helped by the delivery of 38,000 machine tools and lathes. For the sake of comparison: during the war (from the second half of 1941 onwards), the USSR’s own production amounted to around 265,600 cars. Less than 1,700 steam locomotives and only a thousand freight wagons were produced. Most probably, if it hadn’t been for the American help, the Red Army would not have much to fight with, produce the necessary equipment and to transport it to the front...

But of course, if we compare today’s Russia and Ukraine with Germany and the USSR back then, the differences are too great to draw far-reaching analogies. You just need weapons to wage war. And you need money to have them.

There is one more issue worth mentioning related to World War II. In 1939, a good Polish 7TP tank cost about 231,000 zlotys. Thanks to the Small Statistical Yearbook of 1939, we know that the average monthly earnings of a white-collar worker covered by the National Insurance System in 1935 was 280.50 zlotys (for a man). This means that one tank was worth around 800 such monthly salaries. A state-of-the-art American Abrams tank costs about 36 million zlotys. If the average gross salary in the business sector is 7,500 zlotys, then one tank is worth nearly 5,000,000 (five million) such salaries! Modern armaments have become incredibly expensive, so there is no chance that they will be used in huge numbers.

During the gigantic battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army initially had a total of about 8,000 tanks and assault guns there. During WWII, it was the divisions that mattered; the German infantry division in 1939 had 17 thousand people, a Soviet armoured division in 1940 – over 300 tanks. Today, battalion tactical groups and brigade groups take part in the fighting: they are definitely less numerous (the former – up to a thousand people, the latter – about 3,000). It must be admitted that these seemingly weaker units would probably cope with any WWII infantry division, and modern tanks would destroy both Soviet T-34 or IS-2, as well as German Panthers and Tigers or American Shermans.

Lessons from the past

The Cicero’s maxim historia vitae magistra, with which successive generations of Poles are tortured already in primary school, however beautiful, requires an important complement. Yes, history is a teacher of life, but the pieces of advice it gives are truly Pythian (even if I doesn’t seem so at first) and can lead astray. The most important lessons from the 20th century history, however, are obvious: not to get involved in a war of attrition and to work effectively to gain support and international aid. Ukraine has learned both of these lessons, while Russia has definitely not.

How wrong was the illustrious American political scientist Samuel Huntington in his description of Ukraine! He made a mistake – let’s add – a lucky one for us, Poles. In his canonical work “Clash of Civilizations” published at the end of the previous century, he prophesied the following:

“Many people [in the West – DSK] thought armed conflict was likely[…] If civilization is what counts, however, violence between Ukrainians and Russians in unlikely. These are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships for centuries and between whom intermarriage is common”.

SIGN UP TO OUR PAGE No matter what turn the war beyond our eastern border takes, not only will no serious person risk the thesis that Ukrainians are not a nation, or that they are an “undeveloped nation”, but it would also take the utmost bad faith to convince anyone that Ukraine has not, in Huntington's words, made the transition from the Orthodox to Western civilisation. Because – and here is another weakness of the American scholar’s concept – he wrongly defined the Russian civilization, i.e. symmetrically in relation to the Confucian or Buddhist ones, which excludes the Orthodox Church from the possibility of belonging to the West (by the way, it is worth remembering what Huntington thought about the Orthodox Romanians!).

In any case, the “brothers of Cossack descent” have already won the most important battle of this war – and perhaps of the whole period since Ukraine fell into dependence on Russia, so conventionally speaking since 1654 – the battle of identity. That doesn’t mean they won the others. For now, however, comparing the current clashes with those of the First and Second World Wars, one can conclude that Russia is on her way to defeat. And it is clear that no matter what, Vladimir Putin doesn’t want to be a dictatorial president who has lost the war. But you can’t win by willpower alone.

– Dominik Szczęsny-Kostanecki
– Piotr Kościński
– Translated by Dominik Szczęsny-Kostanecki

TVP WEEKLY. Editorial team and jornalists