There are some products of human thought that have aged like fine wine. One of them is Juliusz Mieroszewski's essay “Poland's ‘Ostpolitik’”. Published in the June 1973 issue of the Parisian magazine Kultura, it is now 50 years old. And it is worth reading. Given the current international situation, it is somewhat prophetic.

The text was written at a time when there was no sovereign Polish state. Poland was part of the Soviet block and under the influence of Moscow. Nevertheless, there were discussions among the Polish émigrés in the West about the future of international relations involving Poland, which could not remain a satellite of the Soviet Union forever.

Mieroszewski was a close associate of Jerzy Giedroyc – a Polish writer, lawyer, publicist and political activist who was the long-term editor of the highly influential Paris-based publication, Kultura.

In 1974, the two men jointly formulated the famous doctrine which later became the basis of the Eastern policy of the Third Republic of Poland. Its basic premise was the recognition by a sovereign Poland of the political subjectivity of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarusians (hence the doctrine's acronym: "ULB"). And the harbingers of this concept were contained in Mieroszewski’s "Polish ‘Ostpolitik’".

One might wonder why a native Pole would use a German term in the title of his essay, a term which, after all, has a perfectly adequate equivalent in Polish. Actually, Mieroszewski does not explain this. He only declares that: “Over the last few months I have written about German 'Ostpolitik' and about American 'Ostpolitik'. In turn, it is worth reflecting on Polish 'Ostpolitik' – all the more so because the People's Republic does not – and cannot – have an Eastern programme".

What we are dealing with here is a polemic with circles including heirs to the two mutually antagonistic political camps of the Second Polish Republic [which existed between 1918 and 1939 - ed]: Sanacja and Narodowa Demokracja. Despite their differences, the author accused both of "mummifying" their respective idols: Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski. By this metaphor, he meant the clinging to schemes from the inter-war period without taking into account the changes that had taken place in the world since World War II.

It is worth quoting the following words: “The people who most disparage the creators of political doctrines are their 'late grandchildren'. For they put statements from decades ago into the mouths of leaders – which these leaders would never have said had they been alive.”

As for the heirs of the Sanacja party, known as the "Castle option” (before World War II, Ignacy Mościcki, the president of the state associated with the Sanacja regime, held office in the Royal Castle in Warsaw), did not want to come to terms with Poland's loss of the eastern borderlands of the Second Republic. Thus, they did not accept the territorial shape of the Polish People's Republic following WWII.

Juliusz Mieroszewski criticised this position. He was convinced that it was anachronistic, and condemned Poles to constant feuds with Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians, i.e. nations deserving their own states after the collapse of the Soviet empire. However, he saw in the policy of the “Castle option” the persistent aspiration to reverse the course of history in order to regain the eastern lands of the Second Republic, and the instrumental treatment of the nations inhabiting them – solely as cannon fodder against the Soviets.

In turn, when arguing with the faction represented by the émigré National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe) and its press organ – the London-based weekly Myśl Polska – Mieroszewski reproached it for its pessimistic and fatalistic view of Russia.

According to the columnist, after World War II, the National Democrats residing in the West approached the USSR in the same way as Roman Dmowski [Polish politician, statesman, co-founder and chief ideologue of the National Democracy political movement, and Minister of Foreign Affairs between October and December 1923 - ed.] had approached the Tsar at the beginning of the 20th century. Mieroszewski cited an open letter to Nikita Khrushchev that the Parisian monthly Horyzonty published in 1959 as an illustration of this attitude. This correspondence declared the will of a future non-communist Poland to cooperate with the Soviet Union across political and ideological divides.

According to Mieroszewski, the people who wrote this memorandum (and it is still assumed that it was written by National Democracy politician Jędrzej Giertych, who settled in Great Britain) were convinced that there could be no other Russia than an authoritarian and imperial one, and that the political system prevailing in it played no role.

Hence, the author argued, the conclusion for them was that it was unproductive to seek opposition forces sympathetic to Polish independence aspirations within the Soviet Union. That is why this milieu was in favour of making deals with the Russian establishment – regardless of whether it was white or red.

In Mieroszewski's eyes, this position – as was the case with the 'Castle' option – reeked of anachronism. The publicist recalled that Dmowski was in favour of keeping pace with the main currents of the era, and in the second half of the 20th century, nationalism was one of them. The only thing was that, for Mieroszewsk,i what mattered was the multiplicity of nationalist elements. He saw strong forces in the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belarusian nationalisms that could split the Soviets from within.

And here, we come to the most intriguing strand of the “Polish "Ostpolitik"'. Mieroszewski was not a supporter of the National Democracy, and yet, in a sense, he decided to save Dmowski's thoughts from what his "late grandchildren" wanted to do with them. And they wanted to continue doing so, but no longer in exile, but in Poland. It is about various groups outside the mainstream of Polish politics who, instead of creatively developing the legacy of National Democracy, reconstruct it. And they do so in order to give vent to their own idiosyncrasies, among which the idealisation of Russia and demonisation of the West are conspicuous.

    SIGN UP TO OUR PAGE 
  Meanwhile, a paragraph in Mieroszewski's text is particularly relevant: “All in all, the wisest [National Democracy supporter] will not convince me that Dmowski, were he still alive today, would have written letters to Khrushchev or Brezhnev, nor will anyone convince me that Dmowski … would have disregarded the liberation movements of the Ukrainians, Lithuanians or Belarusians and expressed his readiness to make a deal with official Moscow at the expense of these nations. For Dmowski would have realised that the Ukrainian problem is something completely different today than it was 50 years ago, and requires a reorientation of Polish policy in this respect.”

This opinion of Mieroszewski is most justified. In terms of tactics, Dmowski was a flexible politician. And his pact with the Tsar was precisely tactical. For he had a hostile attitude towards Russia. He saw it as a barbaric, partitioning country.

At the same time, Mieroszewski – willingly or unwillingly – agreed with Dmowski on a key issue: by defending Poland's "Yalta" borders, he supported the model of a Polish nation-state as opposed to the mirages of multiculturalism following the reign of ​​Grand Duke of Lithuania Władysław II Jagiełło.

It is striking that a publicist who was an opponent of the National Democracy appreciated the work of the theoretician of Polish nationalism, something that cannot be said about how he referred to the "Castle" option. What is more, those following discussions in the Third Republic about Polish eastern policy may be surprised that Mieroszewski's piece does not accuse Dmowski's "late grandsons", who wanted to make a deal with the Kremlin, of treason or agency, nor does he call them "bargainers" or "Russian [agents]". This does not mean, however, that he shies away from using strong words. But the ones he does use are shocking because of who they are aimed at.

For the text reads: "I am not going to debate with people whose Eastern agenda consists of emotions, complexes and prejudices. Those gentlemen who proclaim that everything Russian is evil and contemptible are a problem for a psychiatrist, not for a politician.”

So was Mieroszewski – co-author with Jerzy Giedroyc of the doctrine of the annihilation of Russian imperialism – a Russophile? No, or at least not in the sense of showing weakness for what constitutes Russia's civilisational difference from the West.

Simply, the columnist was counting on the fact that in Russian society there would be circles advocating not only the dismantling of the totalitarian system, but also the granting of the right to political subjectivity to the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. Mieroszewski – unlike the émigré Polish nationalists – was on the lookout for dissidents among Russians who would confirm his thesis that Russia need not be authoritarian and imperial. And although his theory of an understanding between Poles and Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians turned out to be prophetic, he was very wrong about "friends of the Muscovites". He succumbed to the illusion that there was some other Russia from the imagination of Polish intellectuals – a free and non-imperial one, representing an alternative to the real one.

His intellectual error should remain a bitter lesson.

Russians who do not want their state to be authoritarian and imperial are politically irrelevant in their homeland. They are not the ones Vladimir Putin fears. Instead, it is the people who would like to get rid of him. But in order to gain power for themselves, not to profoundly change Russia.

– Filip Memches

TVP WEEKLY. Editorial team and jornalists

–Translated by Roberto Galea