When at the beginning of the report titled “Alternative Scenarios of Nuclear Future,” funded by American government funds, there is a note stating that the views expressed in it belong solely to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of Defense and the United States government, it can be highly probable that there are opinions included that officials do not want to express officially.

Such a report has just been released, and it was likely not by chance that it was published on 8 May 2023, which is the anniversary of the end of World War II celebrated in the West. It was signed by a trio of analysts from the team that created the Nuclear Issues Project (PONI) 20 years ago, and it was produced by the renowned think tank CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), which has close ties to the American administration. Intellectual fuel was provided by a group of experts, not only from the United States, who, for understandable reasons, were presented only as “experts.”

Will NATO survive?

The task set by the authors of the report was ambitious: to determine what will be most important for nuclear competition in the upcoming decade. Since some assumptions had to be made, it was established that Putin would still be in power in Russia and Xi in China in 10 years, while Iran would not have produced nuclear weapons, and no new country possessing nuclear weapons would emerge in the world.

However, at least the latter assumption seems inaccurate, as among observers, the opinion is becoming increasingly prevalent that the ayatollahs will produce a bomb in a few months. How will their neighbours react, especially Saudi Arabia? Will they not want to possess the same capabilities as their regional competitor? That is the question!

It is also doubtful whether Vladimir Vladimirovich will survive in the Kremlin for so long, although from the perspective of nuclear rivalry, the name of the head of the ruling clique in Russia is rather secondary. In contrast, Chairman Xi appears to be a more enduring figure in the international landscape. To make things more difficult, it was also assumed that the leaders of both authoritarian powers would face strong internal pressure to achieve their goals, which in each case would be the “greatness” of their country, whatever that may mean.

Another assumption that seems obvious to us but seeing it in print sends a shiver of unpleasant emotion down the spine of a reader residing in Eastern Europe is that “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will continue to exist.” American analysts also assumed the existence of alliances between the United States and countries in Southeast Asia.

So, there are numerous assumptions, and they are debatable. However, the American analysts did not intend to engage in predicting the future; rather, they wanted to determine what their government should do to minimise the risk of a nuclear conflict. Therefore, they adopted relatively conservative and rather unfavourable assumptions. Perhaps rightly so.

How many warheads does each country have?

The fundamental observation shaping the understanding of processes in the upcoming decade is that China is joining the ranks of major nuclear powers. This applies to both the number of warheads and the diversity and capabilities of delivery systems. After all, what good is possessing the largest nuclear payloads if one is unable to deliver them quickly and efficiently to the intended targets after determining which objectives should be attacked?

A true nuclear power must have an entire system in place: from threat reconnaissance to secure command transmission, ensuring that the decision is conveyed accurately to the executing soldiers, all the way to the missile that will destroy the designated target. China has all of this, and the only thing that sets it apart from the United States and Russia is the size of its arsenal.

Exactly how many warheads China currently possesses is a question that nobody outside of the People’s Liberation Army’s staff can answer. Chinese military officials, like those in almost any army worldwide, are generally not inclined to share such information with outsiders. Frankly, most military staff rarely disclose precise details of such information.

Recently, a publication endorsed by the former head of the Strategy Department at the CSIS think tank, Anthony H. Cordesman, appeared on the think tank’s website. It compiled up-to-date information on the arsenals of all countries officially and unofficially possessing nuclear weapons. The data was based on multiple sources, and at times, these sources differed significantly.

Regarding China, it is believed that they have no fewer than 350 warheads, but not more than 410. What is noteworthy is the significant acceleration of their efforts in building new warheads. Within the first two years of the pandemic, i.e., 2020-21, China aimed to produce as many as 118 warheads. The US Department of Defense predicts that at this pace, China will exceed 1500 warheads by 2035. At that point, they will be at a similar level to the United States and Russia, which possess significantly more warheads but have deployed them operationally at around 1670 each.

In the upcoming decade, we will therefore have three major camps possessing nuclear weapons. These will be democratic states, namely the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, with 1670, 290, and 225 warheads respectively. Russia will have 1674 warheads, and China, which will intensively increase their number to achieve parity by the end of this period, although they will already be a formidable competitor earlier on.

It goes without saying that the advantage of the democratic camp over each of its non-democratic adversaries is purely theoretical, just as the advantage of the non-democratic camp as a whole over the West. However, it is worth mentioning Cordesman’s observation that for the United States, “any conflict with either Russia or China would make the power remaining outside the conflict the actual winner of a global nuclear exchange.” It is a sobering thought.

Nuclear future

So what will shape the “nuclear future”? A panel of experts gathered by CSIS analysts identified 11 trends, which they divided into three main groups. The first group is related to broad capabilities of influence: from the increase in the number and variety of weapon types, not limited to nuclear weapons alone, to the development of their precision, and the increased impact of widely available sources of information, including social media, which can be used to spread disinformation. Nuclear competition will not be limited to counting kilotons and missile ranges alone. Equally important will be the potential social unrest caused by the dissemination of falsified information on the internet.

The second group of trends gathered under the general theme of credibility pertains to the resilience of alliance cooperation against various external and internal factors. This involves political and military cooperation, including the sale of conventional weapons and ammunition, as well as the deployment of strategic US assets, namely nuclear weapons, in a manner that meets the expectations of allies. This will occur under conditions of significant organisational stress and may be accompanied by, to use phrasing from the report, “heightened rhetoric.”

Finally, there are issues defined as communication-related but of a different nature than the aforementioned disinformation. It is worth quoting precisely: “Misleading and ambiguous notification due to constant, diverse communication from allies and adversaries through various private and public channels. Increased nuclear threats and blackmail, even during crises.”

The question of good-heartedness

It is worth noting in passing that this is a field in which there is a strong temptation to employ artificial intelligence mechanisms, which can lead to decisions based on algorithmic actions that may be accurate but not derived from humans and not subject to accountability-related controls.

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  Humans certainly reason more slowly than algorithms but possess the ability to reflect on the consequences of their actions, sometimes in an irrational yet ultimately valuable manner. In one of his stories, Stanisław Lem wrote about “good-heartedness” triumphing over the intellectual precision of automatons.

Concerns about basing military decisions on the suggestions of artificial intelligence have recently been reflected in a scientific book in which the author described, among other things, a hypothetical scenario of a US-China nuclear conflict caused by both sides entrusting decisions to algorithms, as well as the actions of AI-driven bots producing and spreading false information, including deepfakes. Who knows, perhaps the author, James Johnson from the University of Aberdeen, was a member of the panel of experts who helped create the CSIS report, as it eerily resembles the situation portrayed in the report I have before me.

US military officials currently have no plans to implement artificial intelligence in combat operations. Earlier this year, Matt Turek, the Deputy Director of the renowned agency DARPA, which is known for its contributions to the creation of the Internet, stated that they are impressed by the capabilities of AI but “it still does not exhibit the level of certainty necessary to entrust it with decisions that impact the life and death of people.”

It remains unknown whether military officials in China, Russia, North Korea, India, or Israel have reached the same conclusion. However, since the CSIS report does not mention the use of artificial intelligence for nuclear decision-making among the emerging threats, it is possible that methods of operation have already been developed to harness its power and rapid situational assessment capabilities while safeguarding against hasty judgments. However, it is not easy for me to envision how this would be achieved.

Sanctions and condemnation

I will not delve into a detailed discussion of the scenarios presented by American experts based on the analysis of trends identified by the panel of experts. What is important in each of these scenarios is that it will not be nuclear technology that decides but rather people. And not necessarily the leaders of nuclear-armed countries, as we commonly imagine, but also those who are threatened by such weapons and may seek to acquire them for their own countries.

Because in the 21st century, it is not that difficult. The technologies are known, and there are many countries on either side of the divide that would be willing to provide nuclear weapons for money or influence. The only significant barrier is international condemnation and potential sanctions that impair technological capabilities.

However, sanctions have significantly lost their value, and their significance is diminishing. They are no longer perceived as a just reaction by the international community to the behaviour of rogue states but rather as a tool of political struggle. Even something seemingly obvious, like imposing sanctions on Russia as an aggressor in the war with Ukraine, is viewed by a number of countries as a Western political initiative and simply ignored by economic powerhouses like China or India. Therefore, a country seeking to acquire nuclear weapons could, depending on the political configuration, count on economic support from many nations.

However, international condemnation, as exemplified by the recent condemnation of Russia at the United Nations, can be mitigated when nuclear weapons start to proliferate, and countries threatened by their neighbours argue that they need them for defence against direct threats. Saudi Arabia, for example, could use such an argument when Iran finally declares that it has acquired nuclear weapons.

South Korea recently made use of a similar argument when faced with a threat from the regime in the North. The country began serious discussions about acquiring nuclear weapons, and a public opinion survey showed that 70% of Koreans wanted their country to possess them. The United States had to provide Seoul with serious and expanded assurances, which were announced at the end of April 2023 during President Yoon Suk Yeol’s visit to the White House.

In return, Korea pledged to abandon any intention to produce nuclear weapons. However, it can be expected that the issue will resurface, as North Korea poses not only a regional but also a global threat. With intercontinental ballistic missiles in its possession, North Korea’s attack on US territory is a real possibility. In such a scenario, it will be much more difficult for Americans to explain the rationale behind defending countries in Southeast Asia when retaliation could reach Los Angeles.

Europe and Asia must understand each other

The conclusions of the panel that created the CSIS report indicate that the key factor conducive to peaceful and controlled development in the upcoming decade will be good alliance cooperation. But what does “good” mean? On one hand, it means that the American hegemon needs to rid itself of its tendency to treat allies condescendingly (which the report openly and sincerely mentions). On the other hand, European and Asian allies need to recognize that they are not competitors to each other and should cooperate. The aim is to avoid a situation where European (and NATO) allies of the United States view with concern Washington’s shift in strategic focus towards competition with China and demand defence against Russia.

On the other hand, Asian allies (and Australia), bound to the United States by much looser alliances than NATO, may feel concerned about signs of US engagement in defending Europe and may want to independently acquire deterrent weapons. In such a scenario, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation would become a dead document, and we would be one step away from a world where nuclear weapons are as widespread as conventional weapons. The probability of their use would also increase disproportionately, and one could say that it would only be a matter of time.

Among the signs indicating the development of the situation in this direction, the report mentions increased armament, including non-nuclear armament, heightened expectations for participation in the “nuclear sharing” program, disputes among allies, and a “general lack of coordination regarding strategic priorities.” Additionally, there is an increased demand from allies for consultations and alliance guarantees.

It is undeniable that many of these factors are already at play. Increased armament is a reality, expectations for participation in “nuclear sharing” are being expressed, not only in Poland but also in other countries. South Korea has obtained additional nuclear guarantees, indirectly raising the question of developing its own nuclear program. The situation in Ukraine, which may expect guarantees against Russian aggression, possibly involving nuclear weapons, is also a daily concern. As for “strategic priorities,” European allies’ positions are often quite divergent.

Moreover, the need for agreement among allies applies to both Asia, threatened by China, and Europe, threatened by Russia. It also involves the awareness that such an agreement is necessary. Can we honestly say that as European citizens, we feel a sense of community with the citizens of Asian countries when it comes to security? Do we even think about it?

In Europe, although the war in Ukraine has temporarily overshadowed the debate on how to ensure security on the continent, signs of the revival of this debate are already emerging. In this context, Poland’s military rapprochement with South Korea seems advantageous. However, French and German ideas of building “strategic autonomy” or acting as a balancing force vis-à-vis China and America should raise serious concerns.

“Wild” scenarios

Despite the current situation, what is unfolding on the horizon is not an inevitable outcome, and this process can be reversed. The remaining scenarios in the CSIS report are much more optimistic and, above all, assume the possibility of restoring nuclear arms control treaties, which currently seems impossible as Russia has withdrawn from them and China refuses to engage in discussions.

However, a different outcome may occur when both countries see determined and united allies on the other side, offering a clear military advantage on one hand and proposals for cooperation and mutual control on the other. This is the essence of the remaining scenarios.

There are, of course, highly unpredictable factors that the report refers to as “wild cards.” It is unknown what will happen if China decides to strike Taiwan, if Iran definitively acquires nuclear weapons and demonstrates it through a test explosion or possibly an attack on Israel, if Russia achieves success in Ukraine through the use of tactical nuclear weapons, if North Korea also decides to use them, or what will happen in the event of a new pandemic outbreak or a global economic depression. Among these “wild” factors, there is also the possibility of an insurgency in the United States, which was previously unthinkable.

It is possible that we will witness a domino effect, where the occurrence of one factor provokes the emergence of others. For example, an attack on Taiwan could encourage the Kim regime to attack South Korea, Russia to use tactical weapons in Ukraine, and Iran to strike Israel. However, playing a “wild card” might also reveal the horrors of war to the world, lead to a sobering realisation, and pave the way for some form of agreement.

In summary, the future remains uncertain, and various factors and events can shape the trajectory of nuclear dynamics. It is crucial to strive for cooperation, arms control, and a shared commitment to peace and security to mitigate the risks and foster a more stable and peaceful world.

General Mark Milley, in his interview with Foreign Affairs, highlighted a seemingly simple and obvious point. The fact is that among those currently making decisions about war and peace, there are no individuals who remember a major and widespread war. While there are those who have ordered or conducted military operations, like General Milley himself, there are no individuals who have witnessed firsthand the immense destruction and suffering caused by a large-scale conflict.

General Milley recounted an experience he had a few years ago during the D-Day commemorations in Normandy, where he had the opportunity to speak with one of the last surviving participants of those battles. This elderly man, a former paratrooper, was wheelchair-bound. General Milley asked him a question that is quite common in American political culture: “Sergeant, what would you like to tell the highest-ranking American military commander today about World War II? What lesson would you like to pass on to me?” He expected a standard response, something about tactics, surviving on the battlefield, or marksmanship. However, in response, the elderly man looked up with teary eyes and said, “General, do not let it happen again. Never again...”

That old paratrooper from the 82nd Airborne Division touched a different world than the one inhabited by modern decision-makers in isolated offices, situation rooms, and reports generated by artificial intelligence. It was a world of people who believe they have control over the situation. But do they really?

– Robert Bogdański

TVP WEEKLY. Editorial team and jornalists

– Translated by jz