TVP WEKLY: In “La fin de la Chrétienté”, which is your latest book, you state that Christianity understood as a civilization is disappearing in the West. To what extent does the disintegration of this cultural matrix cause polarization in France?

CHANTAL DELSOL: It has been a long time since Christianity was an issue that divided France. There is no party directly appealing to the Christian heritage (unlike in other countries of the We). The 1905 law literally pushed into private sphere, perhaps irrevocably. Faith has ceased to spark extreme emotions, it is treated with indifference. It simply doesn’t count. On the other hand that, what has been gaining in importance since the middle of the 20th century, is the erasure, already not of faith, but of the Christian culture.

Is there a chance for Catholicism to regain its influence? Or, maybe, the Catholics has become one of the numerous minorities living in France?

It is possible that the French Catholicism will regain its influence specifically as a minority. Young Catholics, though few in number, are ardent and well-organized. Taking into consideration, that the generation that dragged the Church to the Left is passing away before our eyes, there is room for hope. However, let us not forget that these young Catholics are a tiny minority.

Many observers claim that in 2005, during the EU constitution referendum the old Left-Right divide was overcome and a new dichotomy emerged: a division into those who had benefited from globalization and those who had lost from it. Does this divide apply to the French society & politics?

I don’t think that the Left-Right divide has disappeared or is to disappear. It’s a divide that has existed since the beginning of contemporaneity, separating those who accept it from those who reject it. One can say, that since the moment when the phenomenon of “progress” appears we have been dealing whit Left & Right. Globalization is seen as a part of progress. Those who reject it belong to the right wing, those, who join it – belong to the left wing.

That’s true: this split defines today the society as well as the French politics. Contemporary Left-Right divide is based on issues such as: border protection, immigration, offshoring jobs, compulsory English lessons, and so on. Worst of all this division doesn’t just apply to attitudes but also to public life.

These two groups – the élite and the rest of society – perceive the internal situation from two different perspectives. Sociologist Jêrome Fourquet point out that 77% of affluent French people agree with the statement that “the priority is to deeply transform the country to make it fit the changing world”. And mong other social groups only a tiny minority supports this postulate. Does it mean that the French élite has a vision of their country which cannot be reconciled with the expectations of ordinary people?

As I’ve said, the Left-Right divide can be perceived from the social angle. Earlier, let’s say in the 19th century, the bourgeoisie defended the order and the proletariat was striving after change. Today it is the other way round. The people wants to maintain status quo and the élite is in favor of globalized modernization.

The people is unable to keep up with the élite. To benefit from globalization one needs to be a polyglot, receive education, believe in oneself, be open to the world. Such people are not numerous but is they who form the group that decides the fate of others. While the people, attached to the place they come from, speak only French and don’t travel. Today, we are dealing with a great division between those, who David Goodheart calls “somewheres” and “anywheres”.

To what extent did the immigration bring about this polarization?

Immigration is one of the aspects of globalization, because not only goods circulate without barriers, but also people. France made a mistake by attracting a lot of foreigners during the “Thirty Glorious Years” [alternatively: “Thirty Years of Greatness” – a period of strong growth of economy and living standards in Western countries in the years 1945-75 – ed.] to take advantage of lower costs work.

We must also remember that we pay for colonization, as it is easier to emigrate to a country whose language is spoken. Successive governments did not have the courage to stop this influx because they were paralyzed, say, by conscience. France is easy to get to and even a serious criminal can count on not being expelled.

“Anywheres”, i.e. cosmopolitan elites, bear it indifferently, because they do not live in the districts where immigrants come and have virtually no contact with them. “Somewheres”, ordinary people, react to this situation with indignation, they rebel. Their neighborhood is tyrannized by drug dealers and thugs. They sense a loss of cultural security.

The influx of masses from the Maghreb is radically different from the immigration to France of Italians, Spaniards or Portuguese in the 20th century. Among Muslims, women are confined within a certain framework, while boys do not know any restrictions at all. They deal in drug dealing and criminal activities, it is they who inhabit our prisons.

Sociologists talk about “bipolarization of the middle class”. Its “upper” stratum is being promoted to the upper class, while the “lower” one is degraded to the lower classes. Do you agree with this observation? What may be the political and social consequences of this?

Maintaining a strong middle class is a constant challenge and difficulty for society. The condition here is the so-called social mobility, i.e. moving from one social stratum to another. Without it, an elite detached from the impoverishing nation is forming.

In France, the gap between the elite and the rest of the nation has been widening for several decades, the middle class is disintegrating. This becomes especially visible in the field of education. Thirty, forty years ago it wasn’t unthinkable for a shopkeeper’s son from a godforsaken French village to come first at a polytechnic entrance examination. Today – no chance.

As the statistics show, currently only sons of polytechnic graduates are admitted to polytechnics. A shopkeeper’s son can’t find a school near his home that will allow him to get a promotion. The social ladder has been blocked. The elites are closing up and transforming into castes, and the middle classes are degrading.

Fourquet notes that the only thing the upper and lower classes have in common is Americanization: references to American series, the dream of a house with a swimming pool and a pilgrimage to Disneyland (he reports that one in six French people has visited Disneyland near Paris, and in the group of young people below 35 years old it is as much as 75%). Doesn’t it lead to what you described as “intellectual barbarization”? Is there a chance for some new, common frame of reference to emerge here?

Yes, we are dealing with widespread Americanization, which can be seen, for example, in the fact that Anglo-American names are very popular among the people. This is one of the consequences of globalization. Despite this, many French people are still attached to their sites, to their local cuisine, etc.

Yes, a pilgrimage to Disneyland has become something obligatory, but I have the impression that it does not have such an impact on cultural life. For many poor people, it is a way to travel without leaving the country.

But “intellectual barbarization” is associated with “over-civilization” when, for example, in every French class at school there is a child who would like to change sex. This is due to postmodernism.

President Emmanuel Macron often refers to Charles de Gaulle. Meanwhile, supporters of Gaullism are rather better-off French. Is Macron the president of only a section of society, top earners, managers and those who aspire to the upper classes?

In France, to be taken seriously, you have to call yourself a Gaullist! Anyone who comes to power must appeal to this legacy, it’s almost mandatory. France is not a very democratic country and therefore it is easy to worship a great man here.

Macron, socially speaking, is indeed a typical representative of this hyper-globalist élite that cares little about the culture of its own country, after all, he himself used to say that “there is no such thing as French culture”. From the ideological point of view, he belongs to the morally liberal elite, which does not attach any importance to fatherhood, family, or raising children. He once slipped: “please show me a mother from a large family who would be educated”.

Isn’t the problem that the French public opinion, as you wrote, sees pragmatism – such as Denmark’s revision of its migration policy - as “an appalling concession to reality”?

It is true that the French mentality is not very pragmatic, but rather ideological. The revolution has turned us into a nation of ideologues and ideas will always carry more weight than reality.

Look at the so-called “unattended minors” who are flooding the country. The resources we devote to teaching them the language and providing them with housing are considerable. Mostly, however, these are neither people who care about learning French, nor are they underage at all. First of all, they want to get to England as soon as possible.

In other words, the whole narrative we spin about them is false. Yet we keep repeating it because it fits our worldview. In fact, the results here are disastrous. One cannot play with the facts with impunity.

In one of your articles, you wrote that young Europeans no longer strive to change reality, although this pursuit is part of our civilization. You say that young people become “Orientalized, fascinated by idleness”. Haven’t Asia and the West switched places? Can a Europe with such an attitude resist the dynamic China and Asia?

The philosopher Edmund Husserl once argued that the East may be influenced by the West, but not vice versa. He was wrong. Orientalization takes place not on the political or economic plane, but on the level of philosophy. SIGN UP TO OUR PAGE As we know, man has basically discovered only two answers to existential questions: either the transcendent Judeo-Christian (and also Muslim) God, or the agnosticism and practical wisdom of Asia. As Westerners abandon their transcendent religion, they naturally move closer to the agnosticism and practical wisdom of Asia.

It is true that this change in mentality may stifle the quest for progress that characterizes the West. To some extent, this has already happened. Postmodern societies are those that give up progress. This does not mean, however, that we lose dynamism, because you can be dynamic by defending your own culture or comfort.

– Interviewed by Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski
– Translated by Dominik Szczęsny-Kostanecki

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Chantal Delsol is a French political philosopher. She describes his views as liberal-neoconservative. By faith she is Catholic. In her publications, she opposes the idea of a nation-state, supports European federalism, but claims that the European Union is not a true federation. She has also researched the phenomenon of contemporary populism, which she considers a serious threat to democracy.