TYGODNIK TVP: “If you want peace, prepare for war.” Vegetius’s words have often been repeated since the start of the current war in Ukraine. Is this still true in your opinion?

PIOTR GURSZTYN: I think that peace should generally prevail, and not war. But there is this ancient Roman saying. The lesson of history teaches us that the weak fall to the aggressor. Being an aggressor is not compulsory, but weakness encourages the aggressor. Having armed forces should deter any potential aggressor and in this sense the old Roman saying still holds true.

If we look on the war in Ukraine form a historical perspective, as you mentioned, what is this war like? How can we define it?

This is a war on a gigantic scale. It’s the first symmetrical war we have seen for long time. We’ve seen asymmetric wars of late. This is where one side is a highly developed country employing modern technology and resources and the opposing side consists of warriors, terrorist or guerillas. Here we see two developed countries. One, at least formally is the second ranked army in the world, namely Russia. Ukraine has a population of 44 million, a large army although ranked at thirty in the Global Firepower Index, at least since the start of the war. It resembles the war in Korea or the Second World War rather than the Gulf War or the Afghanistan conflict which we have observed.

Russia is a nuclear power so we cannot include it as part of the Third World, despite having many self-inflicted domestic problems, in many spheres of life. But it is a country that is somewhat highly developed and so it is dangerous. According to the rankings, Russia possessed the second most powerful army in the world, but luckily for us the army had remained neglected. It has a large number of pathological traits and habits- corruption or theft and this has enabled Ukraine to mount a successful defence. This does not alter the fact, that Russia is still a very important and dangerous force.

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  What are the similarities between the current war in Ukraine and those which we know from history?

I can see more similarities than differences. Obviously the military technology has evolved. There are newer weapons systems and possibilities. But the most fundamentally important weapon that will decide the outcome on the Ukrainian front is artillery, as in the First World War and centuries ago. There are figures that show that 90 percent of Ukrainian wounded have been as a result of enemy artillery fire. I’ve also seen some estimates that between 60 and 70 percent of fatal casualties on both sides is the result of artillery. We have to remember that artillery has a new pair of eyes- unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones. There are radar systems that allow the plotting of enemy artillery fire from a considerable range. This has not been possible until now.

You have spoken about the similarities, but what about the differences?

The differences are in the use of new equipment. But these differences are quite few in number. There’s more use of electronics, particularly by the Ukrainians, the use of drones that can observe even the smallest enemy unit. As for other weaponry, I cannot see any surprises. There’s the classic use of armoured forces or rocket artillery.

But the widespread use of the Territorial Defence Forces is one of the surprises and their effectiveness in the early stages of the conflict. It’s happened before, when a highly motivated force, trained for only a short while had mounted an effective defence against an opponent. It was conventional wisdom until recently that a future war would be so technology-heavy that recruited civilians could not be relied on to cope. But this time, they have fought very effectively, inflicting huge casualties on the invader.

Isn’t it the case that the human factor is very important, if not the most important element in an effective fight?

The human factor is the key ingredient. Naturally the soldier should be properly trained and equipped. A highly motivated fighter will be useless with only bare hands. But motivation is the key to all. The Ukrainian army is such a force. Their people know what they are fighting for and you can say that they are comrades and colleagues. In the military, comradeship is paramount.

I once read a work by a retired British officer who wrote about the psychology of combat. People may join the army for patriotic reasons, but during combat, they will risk their lives for their mates, so they must be a team.

This is something that is lacking in the Russian army to a similar extent. There you can see all the pathological traits within society manifest themselves within the Russian army. Murders, killings, and brutal “hazing” are shown. Russian soldiers have been known to fire at their officers, who in tourn cower behind their backs. In the Ukrainian army, such pathological instincts are not exhibited and do not form part of their stronger side. It goes to show how a disciplined army should look.

And just how did this human behaviour look in previous wars that we now from history?

In exactly the same way. Generally the victorious army is the better trained one in which comradeship and the bond of mutual trust between officers and other ranks is strong. Of course there have been wars when brute force has prevailed, when a small but effective army has been beaten by a larger but more ineffective opponent. The Soviet-Finnish war in 1940 is an example. The Finnish army then was like the Ukrainian one today, highly motivated but small. The Soviet army was huge and powerful, so it could overwhelm it’s adversary and that’s why Finland signed a peace with the Soviets on terms disadvantageous to itself.

Still, the psychological dimension is important in war. We are “social animals” after all. Our reaction to fear, and loyalty towards our side have been examined and it is evident that no one will sacrifice themselves for anyone whom they dislike or who has wronged them. But if a soldier sees that someone whom he likes dies, or who is important then he will fight for that life.

Is cyberwar an element that differentiates this war form the previous ones?

In this case cyber warfare is a marginal issue. I’ve noticed two or three examples. The first was Kiyv at the outbreak of war. The Russian attempted to attack, block banks institutions but the Ukrainians resolved this within a few hours. There was information after the Russians tried to paralyse the internet infrastructure of the city of Lviv, but the Ukrainians too got his under control.

General Karol Molenda, the chief of the Polish cyber security force participated in a military symposium in France recently and said that everyone expected that the Russians would mount a cyber “Pearl Harbour”, but this also it did not come to any fruition. In fact, it was Russia that experienced the problems in this area. There are cyber attacks on itself by groups such as Anonymous. Lately however we have not heard too much from either side so the whole issue may have been exaggerated.

Cyberwarfare is one thing, but the second is disinformation.

The propaganda war is ongoing. For the time being it seems to be leaning towards the Ukrainians or at least in the eyes of the West. The Russians are powerless and a losing the propaganda battle. The Ukrainians are more successful and they at least have right on their side. But you cannot defend yourself by this alone without additional help. True enough though, the Ukrainians are more successful and coherent and geared towards the mentality of the modern person. So my hat goes off to them. They’ve done a great job.

How did previous wars look, those in Korea, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan?

The Ukrainian war is similar to the oldest of these conflicts, namely the Korean. There, there were huge, million-strong armies lavishly equipped and they fought in the classic Second World War fashion; artillery bombardments, manoeuvres by major units, corps and divisions, using hundreds of thousands of pieces of equipment.

Vietnam was a different matter; it was an asymmetric war. It was lost by America on a psychological basis. Their hinterland, that is to say the nation or society and the American elites in particular opposed the war. The country was not motivated to fight so withdrew its army without gaining its war aims. If America had been motivated, it certainly would have won the conflict. But this was not so.

The Yugoslavian war was a peripheral one, and chaotic to boot. There were different forms of warfare, guerrilla and conventional such as the well-known Croatian counteroffensive “Operation Storm” in 1995. There were some points of similarity to the Ukrainian war. Regular formations were employed but not on the same scale as today.

We can speak of the Afghanistan conflict as a colonial war, not so much in a political, but rather in a military sense. On the one hand, there were regular, international units and not just American but Polish. Poland participated in this war. On the other hand, the guerrillas , the Taliban were a tribal organisation in their own way. The first Soviet intervention looked similar. They won and the Soviet interventionists lost and had to withdraw.

That’s where any similarity with the current war in Ukraine ends. You can only compare it to those conflicts that employed major formations, Korea, The First and Second World War or the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.

What can we say about the causes of previous wars and today’s. Are they the same?

In my opinion we must look deeper into anthropology. If anthropologists study the first cultures, then mortality was high. One tribe fought with another very brutally indeed and without pause. It was always a part of the evolution of Man. If we come to historical evolution then we have the legacy of many conflicts. In ancient eras, this was written into the life of everyone, which was short, on average of around 20-30 years.

Modern wars are rare. The state has monopolised the means of violence in the 20th and 21st centuries. There are exceptions, but generally violence is the monopoly of the state and they are the only sides authorised to conduct war and, luckily, they control this “privilege” tightly. There are of course various other kind of groupings, guerrilla movements, terrorist organisations and national-liberation movements. These break the rules, but their goals are to create their own states and to joint the club of those who are authorised to conduct war.

Progress in this area is of course, obvious. Because Europe has experienced over 70 years of peace means war is a major event in human history. This is something that has not happened and is a hope that wars will become rarer. But it’s a daydream to think that it will happen and it’s unrealistic to exclude this possibility.

Does every war, apart from strategy and tactics, have its own philosophy?

Every army in the world formulates it’s own concept of warfare for attack or defence. Countries on the right side of the barricade, such as Poland or Ukraine have a solely defensive strategy. No one in our country is preparing to attack others. But the philosophy of the Russian army was always offensive, not just pre-emptive strikes but the conquest of other lands.

On occasion you can see that these concepts start to stray from reality. In the Russian case, Valery Gerasimov, their chief of staff had formulated this strategy. It was very complex and required many different and complicated elements; hybrid warfare, cyber war , special forces, psychological operations and propaganda. Where to locate a kinetic attack or the employment of armour or aircraft formed the final phase. In the event, this went differently and the concept unravelled.

The Russians have excellent analysts and theorists. But when it came to the crunch their army’s fingers were too fat and couldn’t carry out finer stuff. At the beginning, the Russians tried to emulate the American experience in the Gulf War. They sent forward relatively small but mobile battalion groups whose objective was to seize Ukrainian strategic objectives and to paralyse the entire defence. But the Ukrainians shot up these groups and forced them to withdraw. That’s why the war looks how it does and the Russians have reverted to type as to what they can do, brutal artillery bombardment, the destruction of entire cities followed by waves of armour and infantry, as in the Second World War.

Is it a part if this strategy that Russian general officers have died in such numbers?

It’s part of a certain culture or perhaps an anti-culture both in personal relations and in the management of the Russian army. It’s in stark contrast to what happens in NATO armies and in the Ukrainian, that has adopted NATO norms and doctrines. In NATO countries, there is the idea of mission tactics. Here, a commander obtains a task to perform but how to do this is left up to him. Obviously, it can be supervised so he cannot be given full rein in any case. But communication is vital so that superior officers are appraised of any progress. But he is not controlled strictly. He is just told to get from point A to B.

In Russia this looks different. There, it is more hierarchical and inflexible. The method is given and there is always a reluctance to take responsibility. They are punished for taking the initiative.

A digression. In the Austro-Hungarian army before the First World War there was the Order of Maria Teresa. The commander would be awarded if he disobeyed an order but only if his disobedience resulted in success. This was a huge risk. In the absence of a result he faced an firing squad. Honours were given in this particular case as well as for civic courage.

This is absent in Russia. Subordinates have for decades even centuries, looked up to superiors and to secure their own reputations. This is the reason for the deaths of a few dozen Russian general officers who have to take the reins of the army. In the absence of tangible results the general is forced to go to the front line and tell subordinates what to do, to battalion and even at company level.

Thanks to their signals intelligence the Ukrainians obtained detailed information as to the command post of a given general and the location was soon deluged with fire. The sarcastic saying went that the general was “reinforcing the ranks of the angels”.

There have been no casualties among Ukrainian generals, not because they are cowardly but because they are where they ought to be, because they have people who know their business and do not have to lead them by the hand. But latest reports state that the Russians seem to be learning so the Ukrainians are starting to have problems which we’ll learn about in due course.

Is there an element within the strategy of terror, of genocide?

It’s a constant presence in the Russian tradition and above all at the start of this war when it was referred to as a special operation and armoured columns moved on Kyiv. These incidents were rare. The Russians believed their propaganda that Ukraine was not a separate country but only a part of Russia itself. The inhabitants were supposed to greet them with open arms and the whole operation was just the de-nazification of the extreme right-wing elites. When it became clear that the opposition was widespread, supported by the civilian populace who informed military and police units of the location of the invaders, the Russians took a different tack and started mass terror.

We have and to add looting, alcoholism the demoralisation typical of the Russian army, the brutality that is deeply embedded in the army. War crimes were committed but I would avoid the use of the term “intentional genocide”. It was the terrorisation of the civilian population and the ruthless destruction of any point of resistance, Mariupol or Kharkiv. Mariupol is merely a repetition of the events in Aleppo But there we may be able to speak of genocide.

What exactly do you have in mind?

I mean that I think this consists of the destruction of an ethnic group through the kidnap and de-nationalisation of its children. The debate on whether this constitutes genocide is centred on this point. Before the war, I thought as to how a possible Russian invasion of Poland would look. I was convinced that it would be a brutal, murder of civilians, the destruction and the kidnap of children. We have to take this into consideration. A crime is also the burning of a country’s books, an attempted lobotomy of the entire nation. The destruction of its national treasures is an integral part of all this.

Rape and murder of women and children is something that is difficult for us to understand.

It is something that can indeed be understood. It’s the time-honoured practice in the Russian army. Such mass rape was carried out in Chechnya in the 1990s. Formally, it was a part of Russia. It happened in Afghanistan but a truly mass phenomenon occurred in Germany in 1945. Almost every German woman who found herself under Russian occupation was raped.

It’s an anthropological question for me. It’s not like a situation in the Middle Ages for example when the Vikings would pillage to satisfy their primal urges. We’re dealing with an attempt to humiliate a society. The rape is an element of this terror. I don’t know if it has been secretly sanctioned but it has been allowed for sure. The mass nature has been activated.

Usually, generals punished this type of activity. Others turned a blind eye to all this. It looked bad from the propaganda angle and it has a deleterious effect on army discipline since the army had transformed into a gang of rapists and looters. In Russia, this is systemic, not incidental.

Genocide we know is a part of war that we know.

Of course. When I was in my twenties and the war in Yugoslavia had broken out, the massacre in Srebrenica happened. It was horrifying because it was ostensibly in a safe area guarded by a Dutch battalion. They handed over the area to the Serbs through fear. The women survived but were maltreated and raped. The men were killed.

It was very emotional because of this Western myth whose representatives, politicians, journalists and the elites were just full of words when it came to a crisis. These words were unsupported by action.

The German historian and politician, Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke said that “ God always ensures that war returns as the remedy for the human condition”. Do we need this medicine?

Difficult question. I think not. If we look at history, we note that the number of conflicts is decreasing. The question about pacifism is naive which postulates something unrealistic namely that there should not be any conflict whatsoever. But it’s also damaging since the Second World War broke out for this reason. Pacifists were influential in French and British politics and they enabled Hitler to start hostilities. Pacifism has this sin on its conscience.

If we look at culture or pop culture we say that we can eliminate war merely by refusing to participate in one. We should talk of war as a potential fire hazard or a volcano eruption. It’s something that may happen and for which we should be prepared. We don’t have to be incendiaries ourselves but we need to have an extinguisher on hand as well as the knowledge of how to react and to pay for a fire service. That’s how I think we should talk about war.

So how would you characterise this war?

We should look through Polish eyes and be ready. War, despite the fact that we are taxpayers and a group of people has chosen this profession to defend us allows us to sit in front of the television with a tub of popcorn. Observing at the war will not look like this. It will affect all of us. We need to remember that all we have is very fragile. The best way to preserve this is through national solidarity and preparing the nation for defence. We need to play an active part in knowing how to behave in a crisis. We could for example belong to the voluntary fire service, civil defencer as part of the Territorial Defence Force.

The state should create a mass programme of training its citizens including the 50 plus. It’s our only chance of avoiding war even though some maintain that the third world war has already started.

-Interview Marta Kawczyńska

TVP WEEKLY. Editorial team and jornalists

-Translated by Jan Darasz

Piotr Gursztyn is a historian and columnist, a former director of TVP Historia. He is the author of “The Wola Massacre. An Unpunished Crime” (2014) and “Ribbentrop-Beck. Was a pact between Poland and Germany possible?”(2018).